Displaying uncertainty a comparison between submarine subject matter experts by Prouty, James R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-03
Displaying uncertainty a comparison between
submarine subject matter experts
Prouty, James R.












DISPLAYING UNCERTAINTY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN 










 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Susan G. Hutchins 
  Susan S. Kirschenbaum 
 Second Reader: Lawrence G. Shattuck 
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering 
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Displaying Uncertainty: A 
Comparison Between Submarine Subject Matter Experts 
6. AUTHOR(S)  James R. Prouty Jr. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
Advanced Processor Build Program, J.Johnson, NAVSEA 
IWS 5A, Program Manager 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and 
do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. 
Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Distribution Statement 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This study investigates the operational implications of the differences 
between submarine Target Motion Analysis (TMA) experts.  A submarine’s use of 
passive sonar provides uncertain data required to make certain decisions. 
This experiment presents four individual scenarios to three submarine 
TMA experts: Commanding/Executive Officers (CO/XO), Department Heads (DH), and 
Fire Control Technicians (FT).  Ten individuals from each expert group 
volunteered from the Groton, CT, and Bangor, WA, submarine bases. 
A between subject design experiment compared the ranges, range 
envelopes, time, and over or under estimations of range to the contact 
generated by each group of experts.  After the experiment subjective and 
objective data were analyzed in order to determine what, if any, differences 
exist between the three different experts. 
The results indicate that there was no significant difference between 
experts.  Recommendations address improvements in experiment implementation 
which can be integrated into future studies as well as the design of improved 
decision aids. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
141 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Decision Making, Displaying Uncertainty, Area of 
Uncertainty (AOU), Subject Matter Experts, Decision Aids, Target 
Motion Analysis  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii






















Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 
 
 
DISPLAYING UNCERTAINTY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN SUBMARINE 
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
 
James R. Prouty 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., Naval Academy, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 





























James N. Eagle 
Chairman, Department of Operations Research 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the operational implications 
of the differences between submarine Target Motion Analysis 
(TMA) experts.  A submarine’s use of passive sonar provides 
uncertain data required to make certain decisions. 
This experiment presents four individual scenarios to 
three submarine TMA experts: Commanding/Executive Officers 
(CO/XO), Department Heads (DH), and Fire Control 
Technicians (FT).  Ten individuals from each expert group 
volunteered from the Groton, CT, and Bangor, WA, submarine 
bases. 
A between subject design experiment compared the 
ranges, range envelopes, time, and over or under 
estimations of range to the contact generated by each group 
of experts.  After the experiment subjective and objective 
data were analyzed in order to determine what, if any, 
differences exist between the three different experts. 
The results indicate that there was no significant 
difference between experts.  Recommendations address 
improvements in experiment implementation which can be 
integrated into future studies as well as the design of 
improved decision aids. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Submarines cannot see underwater so the crew is forced 
to make decisions based on information provided by the 
submarine’s sensors.  Passive sensors provide information 
that is uncertain, and uncertainties in the information 
displayed on a submariner’s computer screens ultimately 
affect the decisions made by the Commanding Officer. 
Areas of uncertainty (AOU) refer to a graphical 
display tool that has been developed in order to place more 
confidence in the uncertain data obtained by passive 
sensors.  A decision aid that can best represent AOUs to a 
variety of users is a much sought after tool.  A more 
effective decision aid can be developed by evaluating the 
differences between different submarine subject matter 
experts (SMEs). 
This thesis evaluates the differences in TMA 
performance between the Commanding/Executive Officers, 
Department Heads, and Fire Control Technicians with regard 
to how they construe uncertain information when displayed 
in the AOU format.  No significant difference was noted 
between the three expert groups regarding range accuracy.  
The results of this study have been forwarded to the Naval 
Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) in order to develop AOU 
decision aids to be used by the fleet. 
 xviii




Submarines are becoming a useful tool in establishing 
safer ocean boarders and accomplishing strategic 
objectives.  Many aspects of the submarine service have 
changed over the past 107 years.  Advancements in 
technology have altered the way submariners conduct their 
business.  Many nations are either producing or purchasing 
more submarines in order to reap the benefits of these 
“denizens of the deep.” 
A. TARGET MOTION ANALYSIS RESPONSIBILITIES 
Ultimately the responsibility of the submarine rests 
upon the shoulders of the Commanding Officer (CO).  When a 
submarine is engaged with a threat, either surfaced or 
submerged, the CO will typically rely upon a team of 
individuals comprised of the Executive Officer (XO), 
Department Heads (DH), and Fire Control Technicians (FT) in 
order to maneuver the boat without incident.  While a 
submarine is submerged it is blind with the exception of 
information received by the Sound Navigation and Ranging 
(sonar) equipment.  As technology has advanced so have the 
means by which we can interpret sonar data.  Even highly 
sophisticated equipment provides data that contains some 
degree of uncertainty.  Data uncertainty is generated by 
many sources in the environment and the submarine itself.  
Making decisions, given the data uncertainty, is a 
challenging task for any seasoned submarine crew. 
When a contact of interest (COI) is initially 
detected, a section tracking party will be stationed in 
order to track the contact in a more detailed manner than 
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what is normally assigned.  Submarine crews routinely 
conduct just enough Target Motion Analysis (TMA) on a 
contact in the open ocean environment to safely navigate 
the ship without collision. The stakes are higher when 
submerged in a high density surface environment (lots of 
contacts) or when detecting another submerged submarine; 
more individuals are required in the control room in order 
to safely navigate the ship. 
B. SOUND NAVIGATION AND RANGING CHARACTERISTICS 
Sonar systems listen to sounds in the surrounding 
environment and report any noise detections to an operator.  
The sonar operator will then interpret the reported noise 
in order to classify the source.  The source of the sound 
could be anything from biologics (fish) to an anchor chain 
used on a buoy that marks a traffic lane in a strait.  No 
matter where the sound originated from it is priority 
number one to determine if the sound source is a threat to 
the safety of the submarine. 
A submerged submarine presents a unique environment 
for sonar operators solving range estimates to other 
submerged contacts.  When provided with two parameters 
(bearing and frequency), sonar operators are challenged to 
generate three new parameters (course, speed, and range).  
These parameters are used to classify the contact and 
provide solutions to targets. 
Data provided by sonar systems are distributed to 
equipment that is used by the CO, XO, DHs, and enlisted 
specialists such as FTs.  Each of these individuals 
approach a submerged contact scenario based on their own 
intuitive skills that they have been taught or learned by 
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experience throughout their careers.  These three groups 
have a different level of achieved skill and when working 
together provide an excellent combined team effort in order 
to successfully accomplish the many difficult tasks of 
submarine life. 
C. AREA OF UNCERTAINTY 
Sound travels differently in water than it does in 
air.  Water provides a difficult challenge for sonar 
operators when trying to locate the source of sound.  
Background noise in the ocean environment, depth of the 
water, and even the composition of the water provide an 
added degree of uncertainty with regard to the source 
location.  The equipment used by submarine operators and 
decision makers is a lot better than that used in the past; 
however, there will always be some degree of uncertainty 
with regard to the information that is provided to the 
operator. 
During an encounter with another submerged contact a 
submarine crew must adequately deal with the uncertainty in 
the data in order to safely conduct their operations.  An 
Area of Uncertainty (AOU) is generated so that the 
submariners can have an idea of the whereabouts and 
direction of motion of the submerged contact.  AOUs provide 
a general understanding of the contact while the crew is 
working to determin the exact location of the source.  As 
more time elapses and a better understanding of the contact 
develops, the AOU will shrink in size and provide more 
benefit to those trying to analyze the contact. 
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D. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF AN AREA OF UNCERTAINTY 
Imagine that you want to take your family to the zoo 
in order to see the new lion exhibit.  After parking the 
car and walking to the zoo entrance you hear a lion roar.  
Without using any maps of the zoo it would be hard to 
pinpoint the exact direction from which the noise 
originated.  It would be safe to assume that the noise came 
from inside the zoo so the AOU would be the area of the 
whole zoo. 
After entering the zoo the lion roars again.  This 
time it is louder and more directional.  If you were to 
hear the noise from your left side then it would be safe to 
say that the lion is not on your right.  A louder roar also 
indicates that the exhibit is much closer than it was 
originally.  The generated AOU for the lion has changed in 
size to a smaller area because the direction to the noise 
is more discernable than it was in the parking lot. 
After walking to your left for a few minutes, and 
without using a map to the exhibit, the lion lets out 
another roar.  This time the noise is much louder and even 
more directional.  The AOU for the lion’s exhibit becomes 
even smaller than it was when you initially entered the zoo 
and we can pinpoint almost the exact location from which 
the noise came.  A skilled person who has heard many roars 
from lions before may even be able to estimate the correct 
distance to the exhibit. 
In the above scenario, some sources of uncertainty may 
make it more difficult to determine the best course to get 
to the lion exhibit.  Factors such as fog in the parking 
lot, construction in the zoo, or even human limitations 
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like hearing loss would add to the confusion of trying to 
locate the exhibit.  The fog would hide the size of the zoo 
so the initial AOU would have been much larger.  Any 
construction in the zoo may mask the lion’s roar and make 
it difficult to pinpoint the source.  Human hearing loss 
would also add to the confusion of where exactly the roar 
originated and all of this uncertainty would have produced 
larger AOU sizes during the scenario progression. 
E. APPLICATION OF THE AREA OF UNCERTAINTY 
During a section tracking party evolution there are 
more people in the submarine control room than during 
normal business hours.  This increase of submariners 
permits a more effective analysis of a contact by allowing 
more skilled operators to analyze the sonar data.  The 
initial detection of a contact usually is the cause for 
stationing the section tracking party.  Detecting a 
submerged contact from longer distances allows more time to 
station the section tracking party, who can therefore begin 
the analysis before the contact becomes too close. 
Bearing and frequency are the key components received 
by the sonar equipment.  By using these two valuable bits 
of information, contact solutions can be computed to gain a 
better understanding of how the contact is behaving.  As 
time progresses and information is received and analyzed, a 
better understanding of what the contact is doing will 
develop. 
Several independent stations onboard the submarines 
work to analyze contact data.  A geographical plot is used 
to generate several different AOUs during the encounter.  
Initially the AOU will be large because of the increased 
 6
amount of uncertainty with regard to the sonar contact.  As 
the scenario progresses, and confidence in the signal 
either increases or decreases, the AOU will change 
inversely.  The AOU is not the sole source of a contact’s 
evaluation but it does provide a lot of insight and also 
provides a historical view of what the contact did during 
the encounter. 
As several AOUs develop over a period of time, an 
understanding of the contact’s motion is established.  For 
example, if you stood outside the lion exhibit and closed 
your eyes, you could listen to the roars of the lion very 
clearly.  If initially you hear the lion roar to your left 
and subsequently hear the lion roar to your right, you 
could deduce that the lion is traveling from left to right. 
A contact solution is generated by the geographical 
plotter based on observing the generated AOU and is 
provided to the XO.  Several different sources of contact, 
such as the time frequency station and the sonar 
supervisor, evaluate the contact’s information in order to 
generate their own independent solutions.  The XO is 
required to obtain as many differently sourced contact 
solutions as possible in order to determine the best 
possible solution for the contact.  The solution provided 
by the geographical plotter based on AOU will be assigned a 
certain level of confidence by the plot supervisor and the 
XO will take this confidence into account while generating 
his own solution.  The combined solution generated by the 
XO is then passed to the CO as the best possible solution.  
The CO will add another level of scrutiny and will base his 
command decision on this refined contact solution.  The 
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whole process is extremely challenging and requires skilled 
operators in order to effectively conduct target motion 
analysis (TMA) operations. 
F. PROBLEM DEFINITIONS 
There are many steps involved in producing a solution 
that has a high confidence level to the CO.  The AOU is a 
small but important part of the process.  Making decisions 
given uncertain information is a daily event onboard a 
submarine.  More accurate range estimates can be determined 
if an AOU is utilized by submariners during the TMA 
process.  During a submerged contact scenario, observing 
the AOU changes over a given time period will allow the 
operator to accurately estimate the contact’s range and to 
estimate an accurate solution to the COI. 
It is unknown how accurate submarine operators are at 
estimating ranges given the AOU data.  There are generally 
three different recognized expert analysts onboard U.S. 
submarines that use the AOU.  To make an assumption that 
they analyze the AOU differently is logical.  It is also 
logical to assume that all three groups (CO/XO, DH, and 
FTOW) would have different accuracies once they generate a 
range estimate based on the AOU.  A better understanding of 
the differences between these three groups of individuals 
allows for further research into how to possibly display an 
AOU best and the users can then report better TMA range 
estimates when they are presented with uncertain data. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
The research was conducted by presenting the three 
different groups of submarine TMA experts with several 
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scenarios involving AOUs.  During each computer generated 
scenario the AOUs shifted around the monitor to simulate 
contact motion.  Basing their contact solution on the 
displayed AOU, each participant’s solutions were 
scrutinized. 
The range estimates were examined through extensive 
statistical analysis in order to determine if there was 
indeed a difference in accuracy between the three groups of 
experts.  Any significant differences in accuracy will 
provide for further research investigations.  The 
difference between the participant’s solution and the 
scenario truth was used as the measure of effectiveness 
(MOE).  A smaller range difference indicates that the 
participant was more accurate than if they had generated a 
large range difference. 
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There are two basic types of sonar: active and passive  
(L-3 Communications SeaBeam Instruments, 2000; Liberty, 
2006). Most submarines can use an active sonar system that 
transmits a pulse of sound energy into the ocean and 
listens for a returned echo.  A returned echo may help a 
submarine’s fire control tracking team locate a Contact of 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. TARGET MOTION ANALYSIS 
Target motion analysis (TMA) is used by submarine 
operators to locate and track contacts in submerged 
environments.  The process of TMA is time consuming; 
several refined solutions for a given contact are required 
before a section tracking party obtains an accurate 
solution.  This chapter provides background information on 
the types of sonar that are available, the TMA process, and 
the different causes of uncertainty when obtaining data 
during a TMA evolution. 
A submerged submarine presents a unique environment 
for sonar operators solving for range estimates to other 
submerged contacts.  When provided with two parameters 
(bearing and frequency), sonar operators are tasked with 
the difficult job of accurately producing three parameters 
(course, speed, and range).  Research has demonstrated that 
sonar operators can provide more accurate range estimates 
to a submerged contact if they are given a graphical 
representation of the uncertainty surrounding their sonar 
solutions (Kirschenbaum and Arruda, 1994; Brolese, 2005; 
Brolese and Huf, 2006). 
1. Sound Navigation and Ranging 
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Interest (COI).  Active sonar typically provides a more 
accurate solution for the contact; the drawback to using 
active sonar is that the submarine will give away it’s 
position to a contact. 
More often than not, submarine crews will track their 
prey using passive means (Liberty, 2006; Dry, Lee, Vickers, 
and Huf, 2005).  This is done by using different sensors 
(or arrays) in order to passively obtain contact 
information while emitting a minimal amount of noise into 
the environment.  Using passive sonar allows submarines to 
remain quiet and still formulate a solution to a contact 
they are tracking.  The submarine tracking party can only 
calculate a solution based on the information that is 
received by the sensors.  While tracking a contact with 
passive sonar a submarine crew is limited to whatever noise 
the contact emits.  Bearings (By) and frequency (f) are the 
two main parameters detected with passive sonar and are 
both utilized when calculating solutions to a COI (Coll, 
1994; Bakos, 1995). 
2. Signal Frequency 
Frequency of the received signal can be used to 
identify the source of the signal, estimate a range to the 
contact, and eventually generate an independent contact 
solution.  All submarines generate a unique noise signature 
that is susceptible to detection by a submerged sensor 
(Liberty, 2006).  This unique signature allows the crew to 
classify the submarine.  Before a submarine crew deploys 
they gather intelligence on suspected submerged contacts 
they may detect while on deployment.  Using this 
intelligence, an estimate of the COI’s maximum speed and 
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behavioral patterns can be postulated by the watch section.  
Speed data is a key factor in determining the contact’s 
solution as the scenario progresses. 
A range estimate to the COI can be calculated by 
evaluating several parameters regarding the local marine 
environment, then using these parameters to predict the 
distance that noise could travel and be detected.  
Equipment used by the section tracking party is limited by 
the sensitivity of the sensors in the passive sonar arrays.  
By understanding the limitation of the passive sonar 
sensors a prediction can be made regarding the effective 
range at which any contact can be detected.  Frequency data 
obtained on the COI may also be used to determine the 
maximum range of a contact.  High frequencies typically 
indicate the contact is closer.  Some low frequencies can 
travel extremely long distances certain water temperatures.  
Higher frequencies suffer too much attenuation, over long 
distances. 
3. Bearing 
Bearing data on a contact is obtained from the ship’s 
sensors.  By observing contact bearings, for a given time 
period, a bearing rate can be calculated.  For example, if 
an initial detection on a submerged contact has a bearing 
of 090 and ten minutes later the contact has a bearing of 
080, then the calculated bearing rate is: left one degree 
per minute.  Bearing rates are continually being updated 
and are a necessity in order to best understand what the 
COI is doing.  A high bearing rate (five degrees per 
minute) typically indicates the contact is close; a lower 
bearing rate (one degree per minute) is an indication that 
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the contact is further away.  However, these are general 
rules of thumb as there are always exceptions regarding 
range estimates based on bearing rates. 
Figure 1 shows an example of bearing data from a 
submerged contact.  When a submarine crew plots bearing 
data to a contact, initially there is a large number of 
possible solutions for the COI.  Two of these possible 
solutions for the contact are depicted by S1 and S2 
respectively.  Both S1 and S2 require the COI to travel at 
different speeds and ranges.  A submarine tracking party 
will use a variety of tools and equipment to analyze the 
data to calculate the best contact solution.  The amount of 
data obtained on a given contact can be overwhelming. 
This thesis is part of an ongoing experiment by the 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) in order to better 
understand how experts view AOUs.  The rationale for this 
thesis experiment is to reduce the cognitive load on the 
fire control tracking team by examining possible displays 
and identify differences in performance based on 
experience.  Cunningham and Thomas (2005) provide an 
excellent source for more in depth TMA background 
information. 
 
Figure 1.   Example of Bearing Data. 
 
Figure 1 is a display of a simplified scenario illustrating the nature 
of TMA bearings.  For this example, ownship is taking a path defined by 
the points P1..4 and is assumed to have a constant velocity and have 
regular bearings sample rate.  Each point is equidistance and 
represents the point at which the bearings B1..4 were taken.  These 
bearings give an indication of the direction of the target relative to 
the point of ownship where the bearings were taken. (From: Cunningham 




Unlike the surface Navy where sailors can use visual 
means to locate contacts, submariners rely upon their 
equipment to detect contacts.  This reliance upon sonar 
imposes restrictions upon the degree of confidence that is 
placed upon the received data (Dry, et al, 2005; Schunn, 
Kirschenbaum, and Trafton, in press; Brolese and Huf, 
2006). The ocean environment, submarine equipment, and even 
the submariners themselves generate a large amount of 
uncertainty in this inherently difficult task.  Considering 
the sources of uncertainty permits a section tracking party 
to generate contact solutions in which the assumptions and 
potential flaws or weaknesses are made explicit. 
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Sound travels approximately five times faster in water 
than it does in air because water is much denser. Sound is 
also more susceptible to interference in water because the 
characteristics of the fluid can change rather quickly in 
an ocean environment.  The density of the water is affected 
by pressure, temperature, and salinity (Liberty, 2006).  
Signal ambiguity develops because sound does not typically 
travel in straight lines (Kirschenbaum and Arruda, 1994). 
Temperature and salinity can change rather quickly 
because of ocean currents and environmental factors.  These 
factors are not typically predictable.  Pressure changes 
are the most predictable because it changes only with 
depth.  The varying density of water will affect the speed 
and path in which sound travels through water. (Schmidt, 
Chayes, Caress, 2006).  This new, unpredictable path the 
sound traveled through the water increases the level of 
uncertainty with regard to any contact solution that is 
generated. 
The submarine sensors and electronic gear used in 
passive sonar systems are not perfect.  After a signal is 
detected by the sonar system it is processed by electronic 
equipment and presented to an operator.  A small degree of 
uncertainty is generated between the sensors detecting a 
signal and the signal being presented to an operator 
because of the algorithms used by the computer 
(Kirschenbaum and Arruda, 1994).  The human operator, 
similar to the sensor, has inherent flaws in judgment and 
sensory skills required for analysis.  Even when 
uncertainty is high decisions must be made.  Any tool that 
 
could assist a section tracking party in making better 
decisions, given these uncertain conditions, would be worth 
investigating. 
5. Area of Uncertainty 
An AOU can be calculated using computer algorithms 
based on environmental parameters and contact information. 
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a possible AOU with two 
different colored ellipses generated for the contact in 
Figure 1.  The inner ellipse indicates a probability that 
is less than the probability represented by the inner and 
outer ellipses combined.  For example, the inner ellipse 
could represent a 66% probability that the COI is located 
within that region and the outer ellipse could indicate a 
95% probability the COI is located within both the inner 
and outer ellipses combined.  Research is ongoing to 
determine the best combination of ellipse probabilities in 
order to best represent uncertainty. 
 




During each ownship maneuver phase of the contact 
evaluation, the AOU will change based on subsequent data 
received.  As more data is obtained on the contact, 
unlikely solutions can be eliminated, and the AOU will 
shrink in size.  With a smaller AOU, the process of 
predicting a contact solution becomes more reliable.  If 
the mission is to launch a torpedo or to go to periscope 
depth the AOU can provide a good estimate for range data on 
the contact during that evolution. 
6. Area of Uncertainty Research 
When a graphical representation of uncertainty is 
displayed for users, the degree of effectiveness of the 
displayed uncertainty varies with regard to the difficulty 
level (easy or hard) of the scenario.  Large differences in 
the performance of participants between easy tasks (low 
noise scenarios) and harder tasks (high noise scenarios) 
have been observed (Kirschenbaum and Arruda, 1994; Brolese, 
2005).  When comparing the use of uncertainty ellipses it 
was demonstrated that the aid was only effective during the 
harder scenarios. 
Kirschenbaum and Arruda investigated the effects of 
using a graphical representation of uncertainty to 
represent the probability that a contact is contained 
within the ellipse (Kirschenbaum and Arruda, 1994).  
Brolese extended the Kirschenbaum and Arruda research to 
investigate what method of uncertainty representation leads 
to the best overall performance by the operator (Brolese, 
2005). 
There were two different scenarios presented to the 
participants in the Brolese study.  Five different ellipse 
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probabilities were used in both scenarios.  Brolese 
measured the percentage of times a participant was able to 
correctly estimate a range to a contact for all ellipse 
percentages.  Specifically, the contact had to be contained 
within the range limits set by the participant.  The range 
estimates reported by the participants using the 95% 
ellipse contained the COI approximately 60% of the time.  
The research demonstrated that the 95% ellipse was more 
effective in supporting participants when estimating 
overall range data to contacts. 
Figure 3 supports that in difficult scenarios, unlike 
easier scenarios, there was indeed a significant difference 
in the accuracy of range estimates provided by the 
participants.  In the more difficult scenarios both the 50% 
and 95% AOU produced approximately similar results with 
regard to minimizing absolute range errors.  The 95% 
ellipses had the most pronounced effect on aiding the 
participants’ performance during both the difficult tasks 
and easier tasks in that it produced the lowest absolute 
range errors and more correct range estimates on average. 
 
Figure 3.   Ellipse Condition versus Absolute Error. 
(From: Brolese, 2005). 
 
7. This Study 
The primary aim of the present study was to continue 
to explore the findings of Kirschenbaum and Arruda (1994), 
and Brolese and Huf (2006), by examining the effect of 
expertise of users regarding displayed uncertainty.  
Kirschenbaum and Arruda recommend further research in the 
perceptual and cognitive elements used by submarine experts 
and their use of uncertainty ellipses to better understand 
the role of expertise in range estimations (Kirschenbaum 
and Arruda, 1994). 
The AOU provided to participants in the present study 
was similar to the 95% ellipses shown in previous studies.  
During the course of the present study, Brolese and Huf 
reported additional research that casts doubt upon which 
ellipse AOU (50% or 95%) provides the most benefit to the 
user (Brolese and Huf, 2006).  These findings may be of 
military significance to the Australian Navy because their 
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submarine operators are only provided a 95% ellipse.  
Brolese and Huf demonstrated that “50% ellipses 
consistently lead to more correct and accurate proximity 
decisions than the currently utilized 95% ellipse” (Brolese 
and Huf, 2006, p. 5). 
Given the conflicting findings between the two studies 
it was decided that the use of an ellipse to depict a 95% 
AOU would not be inappropriate for the present study.  All 
participants were subject to the same conditions during the 
experiment and the purpose of the study was to determine 
any significant differences in performance between the 
different groups of subjects. 
By administering scenarios to operators with three 
different levels of expertise within the submarine 
community, the mission is to determine if there are any 
significant differences in range estimates between 
subjects.  The different levels of expertise are: 
commanding/ executive officers, department heads, and fire 
control technicians.  All three groups of experts responded 
to the same scenarios and their contact solutions were 
analyzed to determine if one particular expert group 
provided more accurate ranges. 
B. DECISION AIDS 
The ability of submariners to interpret and reason 
with decision aids is increasingly important as technology 
advances.  Some of the cognitive workload may be mitigated 
by the use of well-designed decision aids.  An aid that 
reduces mental workload and allows a user to obtain needed 
information “at a glance” is a much sought after tool 
(Hutchins, 1996; Larkin and Simon, 1987).  Cognitive 
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scientists and cognitive systems engineers are among those 
who are skilled at understanding the way in which humans 
interact with their environment. 
Diagrammatic representation and reasoning is an area 
of research that is focused on how humans or machines can 
represent information using diagrams and solve a problem or 
answer a question while using those diagrams (Narayanan, 
1997).  Cognitive scientists apply diagrammatic reasoning 
to understand the interaction of three complex factors: 
cognitive and perceptual skills of the user, graphical 
properties of the external representation, and the 
requirements of the specific task being undertaken (Peebles 
and Cheng, 2003). 
Regarding depicting AOUs, a number of investigations 
have reported how cognitive and perceptual skills of the 
user, graphical properties of the external representation, 
and the requirements of the specific task being undertaken 
have affected the user (Kirschenbaum and Arruda 1994; 
Brolese 2005; Brolese and Huf 2006).  The focus of these 
investigations was to develop a tool specifically designed 
to represent uncertainty with the goal of supporting 
submariners in their decision making process. 
Submariners operate in an extremely complex 
environment.  The size of the crew is limited so there are 
typically several tasks assigned to each member of a watch 
section.  Multitasking is an advantage only when the user 
can efficiently perform each task.  As the number of tasks 
increase so does the amount of information that needs to be 
assessed.  Designers of graphical interfaces seek to 
consider how different quantities are encoded and how to 
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balance the cost of familiar representations with 
computationally advanced representations in order to enable 
a user to efficiently analyze the data.  Guidelines for 
further development of visual displays and graphical 
interfaces have been developed by research (Peebles and 
Cheng, 2003). 
1. Principles of Decision Aiding 
Decision theorists argue that in order for optimal 
decision making to take place a thorough analysis of all 
data and hypotheses must occur; these evaluations typically 
involve complex equations and extensive calculations in 
order to arrive at an optimal decision.  Analysis 
strategies employed by decision makers generally involve 
sophisticated mental computations and a lot of data 
(Hutchins 1996, Dry, Lee, Vickers, and Huf, 2005). 
Graphics, by virtue of the presentation of an 
integrated, synthesized representation of the critical 
data, allow users to omit time consuming steps, such as 
calculations and estimations, in their evaluation of data.  
For example, during a contact evaluation in a submarine 
scenario, several range estimates to a COI are calculated.  
These calculations are typically cognitively challenging, 
as well as time consuming.  When a graphical depiction of 
range is available this eliminates the need to calculate 
range and thus frees up an operator’s mental capacity for 
other tasks (Hutchins 1996; Dry, et al, 2005). 
Beyond range calculations, a large amount of data 
(speed, course, bearing, range, and bearing ambiguity when 
using a towed array) need to be analyzed by a submariner 
during the TMA process.  In addition to the processing of 
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data, working memory is required for other tasks.  An 
Officer of the Deck (OOD) uses working memory to maintain a 
list of actions taken by the section tracking party during 
an evolution and for predicting possible scenario outcomes. 
Predicting is a difficult cognitive task that depends 
heavily on working memory (Wickens, Lee, and Liu, 2004). In 
order to predict accurately one must consider current 
conditions, future conditions, and then mentally simulate, 
using the decision maker’s mental model to determine the 
expected outcome.  When our mental resources are tasked to 
the limit (maximum capacity) or overrun with several 
concurrent tasks our ability to predict rapidly 
deteriorates.  A graphical display that includes a summary 
of critical data would decrease the cognitive workload 
required to synthesize the data and free up the mental 
capacity of the OOD for other tasks. 
In the process of reducing the mental workload 
required of a submariner, well designed displays may also 
produce the additional benefit of minimizing the amount of 
human error in decision making.  The operation of these 
systems in the fleet is the true test of how well the 
principles of decision aiding have been observed during the 
research and development phase of production. 
Newly developed systems will be judged on their 
ability to minimize the amount of incompatibility placed 
between the system and the user (Hutchins, 1996).  Research 
on the way humans perceive displayed information and make 
decisions on that information is important in developing 
decision aids that minimize mental workload, provide needed 
information “at a glance”, and minimize human error. 
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2. Data Fusion 
The quality of an aid and the way the human utilizes 
the information provided by the aid are two factors that 
ultimately determine the user’s performance during a task.  
Specifically how much trust the user places in the aid, the 
way in which information is presented to the user, time 
pressure, and the level of risk involved affect the overall 
utilization of an aid.  The process of data fusion involves 
input from several sources, each of which provides 
information at a different level of abstraction (Bisantz, 
Finger, Seong, and Llinas, 1999). 
Information provided from a data fused plot is 
presented to the user through the computer interface.  
These interfaces require training the user before the user 
can fully understand what is presented.  An interface with 
multiple levels of information presented in a fashion that 
is easily understood by the user can save time and effort 
when formulating solutions in a complex, uncertain 
environment.  Specifically, ease of recognition is directly 
related to how explicit and implicit information is 
represented (Larkin and Simon, 1987). 
3. Factors Regarding an Aid (Trust and Presentation) 
a. Trust 
Trust in an advanced automated system does not 
come easily.  The amount of trust placed in an aid will 
affect a user’s reliance on the system (Sheridan, 1988).  
Empirical results suggest that the strategy employed by 
users may be affected by the trust in that system.  For 
example, when participants required financial advice from 
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an automated system, confidence in the system declined when 
poor advice was given (Lerch and Prietula, 1989).  A new 
strategy for most users was to not use the system at all 
because of the lost trust. 
b. Presentation 
The utility of an aid is determined by how the 
information is presented.  Past research has focused on how 
to display uncertainty so that the true probabilities of 
the data can be presented to a user (Kirschenbaum and 
Arruda, 1994; Andre and Cutler, 1998; Brolese and Huf, 
2006; Brolese, 2005).  The research by Andre and Cutler 
(1998) and by Kirschenbaum and Arruda (1994) demonstrate 
that different visual representations of uncertainty 
resulted in a measurable difference in user accuracy.  
Brolese and Huf (2006) and Brolese (2005) built on the 
Kirschenbaum and Arruda (1994) research by determining how 
to specifically represent uncertainty visually in order for 
the user to achieve the most accurate result. 
In the research by Andre and Cutler, when no 
visual representation was provided to the user, the 
participants appeared to forget that there was any degree 
of uncertainty involved in the experiment.  Kirschenbaum 
and Arruda (1994) demonstrated that when verbal 
representations of uncertainty were presented to their 
participant performance was less accurate than when an 
elliptical ring representing uncertainty was displayed.  
These findings suggest that it is worthwhile to continue 
investigating how best to visually represent uncertain 
information. 
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A well-designed decision aid will support the 
user by reducing the demand on the limited cognitive 
processing capability of human beings (Dry, et al., 2005).  
Because of our limited processing abilities, a decision 
maker may fail to remember critical data, overlook 
important information, make decisions too hastily, and 
possibly make decisions that are not correct (Hutchins, 
1996). 
4. Graphical Displays 
Graphical displays visually present measured 
quantities of data by providing combined points, lines, a 
coordinate system, numbers, symbols, words, shading, and 
color to a user.  Graphics are instruments that support 
complex reasoning about the quantitative information 
provided.  Well-designed data graphics are typically the 
simplest, and at the same time, the most powerful form of 
information presentation available (Tufte, 2001). 
Graphical displays should show data in a format that 
best supports the user’s needs, induce the viewer to think 
about the substance of what they are viewing rather than 
the means of getting it, avoid distorting what the data 
represent, encourage the eye to compare different pieces of 
data, and be closely integrated with the statistical 
descriptions of a data set (Tufte, 2001).  The more closely 
the presented data represent the needed information to the 
user, the better the user can effectively use the data.  
Larkin and Simon (1987) believe the advantage of a good 




information is not necessarily based on the amount but on 
the ability of the user to successfully compute accurate 
results. 
There is limited research on the impact of displayed 
uncertainty on the performance of decision makers (Brolese 
and Huf, 2006; Kirschenbaum and Arruda, 1994).  Research on 
how graphical displays can represent data the most 
effectively is imperative for a technologically advanced 
society. 
5. Advantages of Graphic Displays 
Recent technological advancements have led to dramatic 
increases in computational speed and sophistication of the 
graphical display capabilities of computers.  New 
technological formats will interact with task structure and 
improve situational awareness and task performance of 
submariners (Kirschenbaum and Arruda, 1994).  Research in 
required to determine how these new improvements will 
affect a user’s ability to analyze data and make decisions. 
While the processing capabilities of computers have 
increased the processing capabilities of the user have not.  
If display designers do not take into account the 
limitations of the user, then it is unlikely that the true 
potential of the new technology will be realized (Dry, et 
al., 2005).  Technological improvements with respect to 
automation do not necessarily translate into benefits for 
the user (Roth, Patterson, and Mumaw, 2002). 
Representation aiding is where direct manipulations 
and graphical techniques make abstract information more 
concrete in complex and dynamic domains (Bennett, Toms, and 
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Woods, 1993).  Analog to digital conversions are required 
in order for data to be presented in these new formats.  
Configurable properties of the data displayed can be either 
structural or dynamic.  The structural and dynamic 
properties of a display describe the behavior or movement 
of graphical elements with respect to other elements 
(Bennett, Toms, and Woods, 1993). 
6. Cognitive Engineering 
“Cognitive engineering is an interdisciplinary 
approach to the development of principles, methods, tools, 
and techniques to guide the design of computerized systems 
intended to support human performance” (Roth, Patterson, 
and Mumaw, 2002, p. 164; Roth and Woods, 1988).  The main 
cognitive areas of concern are problem solving, judgment, 
decision making, attention, perception, and memory. The 
goal of cognitive engineering is to develop interactive 
systems that are easy to learn, and easy to use, with the 
end result being improved user performance (Roth, 
Patterson, and Mumaw, 2002). 
Cognitive engineering advocates that users and the 
tasks they perform should be the central focus for system 
design specification.  The design of systems is viewed as a 
means to create a tool that assists users in their decision 
making.  This approach benefits the user because the 
computer-based tools and aids will be designed to solve the 
appropriate problem.  Cognitive engineering provides 
opportunities for computational technology to increase the 
potential to facilitate and augment human cognitive 
activities, e.g., advanced data visualization techniques 
used in decision making (Roth, Patterson, and Mumaw, 2002). 
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Considerable time and money have been spent developing 
cognitive tools to improve human interfaces with 
technologically advanced software.  A specific tool was 
designed to support cognitive engineers in developing 
software which models and documents the Cognitive Task 
Analysis (CTA).  The Computer-Aided Cognitive Systems 
Engineering (CACSE) tool’s benefit is that the design of a 
Decision Support System (DSS) will be a direct result of 
the cognitive issues and relationships determined during 
the CTA.  “System developers using the CACSE-supported 
process would deliver fully functional DSSs that embody 
solutions to the cognitive demands of the domain and 
provide dramatically improved joint (human + DSS) decision-
making effectives – a critical component of information 
dominance” (Potter, Elm, Roth, and Woods, 2001, p. 2). 
7. Psychological Implications for Submarine Display 
Design 
a. Perceptual Factors Influencing Display 
Design 
Perceptual factors must be considered by 
engineers in the designing of displays.  Several factors 
may make it difficult for a user to effectively use a 
display to make decisions.  When using grey scales for 
displayed information, the background may determine the 
brightness of the different shades used.  These varying 
levels of contrast may be distracting to the user and may 
also cause additional mental fatigue. 
When using color in display design, there are 
implications as to which colors are located adjacent to 
each other (Dry, et al, 2005).  For example, red and blue 
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should not be used in close proximity because of a 
phenomenon called chromatic aberration.  Chromatic 
aberration is the difference in wavelengths between two 
colors in close proximity where the user cannot focus on 
the two colors at the same time (Bradley, Zhang, and 
Thibos, 1989). 
b. Cognitive Factors Influencing Display Design 
Designing displays requires that human cognition 
be evaluated in order to increase the usefulness of the 
display (Wickens, Lee, and Liu, 2004).  Several factors 
such as attention and short-term memory limitations require 
consideration when designing displays.  Humans can only pay 
attention to limited amounts of information for limited 
amounts of time (Wickens, Lee, and Liu, 2004; Dry, et al, 
2005). 
The short-term memory limitations of the 
display’s user must also be considered.  Too much 
information on a display will limit the users effectiveness 
with regard to the decisions that are made based on the 
information presented.  The amount of information that can 
be stored in short-term memory is believed to be five to 
nine items, varying according to complexity, presentation 
sequence, and length of time the information must be 
remembered (Dry, et al, 2005). 
8. Quantity of Information Presented in an Aid 
Research provides an understanding of the quantity of 
information required by experts while making decisions.  It 
has been suggested that it is not necessarily the quantity 
of information used by experts, but the ability of the 
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expert to focus on what information is relevant (Ettenson, 
Shanteau, and Krogsad, 1987; Shanteau, 1992b).  Researchers 
and decision aid developers must take into account the 
cognitive factors of the human when designing their work.  
Quality, not the quantity, of information should be 
emphasized by designers who are building aids for decision 
makers. 
C. EXPERTISE AND DECISION MAKING 
Judgment and decision-making (J/DM) is an important 
topic of study for human factors researchers.  Two specific 
fields to study within the topic of J/DM are experts and 
expert systems (Shanteau and Stewart, 1992).  In the fields 
of decision making, planning, and problem solving, 
expertise has been one of the most difficult concepts to 
understand, capture, and quantify (Serfaty, MacMillan, 
Entin, and Entin, 1997).  Even though experts are perceived 
by non-experts as “those people with all the answers” and 
are the ones we trust in their specific field they are 
certainty not perfect.  In fact, experts have cognitive 
limits, individual characteristics, and preferred 
strategies that are common amongst their everyday practices 
(Shanteau, 1988; Wickens, Lee, Liu, and Becker, 2004). 
Experts certainly are not infallible and their complex 
behaviors are just one reason they are so difficult to 
study (Edwards, 1992). 
Many experts employ decision aids.  It would be a 
mistake to study only the expert and not the aids they use 
and the amount of information they require. By 
understanding the way experts make decisions, and the 
information required for them to make these decisions, 
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researchers hope to develop expert systems that “are based 
on codification of the knowledge and decision rules of 
experts” (Shanteau and Stewart, 1992, p. 101). 
The domain of military command and control often 
involves complex decision making situations, uncertain 
information, and high-tempo tactical and operational 
environments.  In these situations there is typically more 
than one correct answer to a problem.  One characteristic 
that differentiates the novice from the expert is the 
timeliness of decisions made.  Experts appear to be better 
at making decisions with information that is limited and 
ambiguous, entails a high degree of uncertainty, and is 
within a multidimensional battlespace.  The ability to make 
these decisions has been effectively labeled as battle 
command decision-making expertise (Serfaty, et al., 1997). 
1. Why Study Expert Decision Making 
There are many different definitions for “experts.”  
An expert is “one with the special skill or knowledge 
representing mastery of a particular subject.” (Webster’s, 
1993)  This definition provides the rationale for trying to 
determine if there is indeed a difference between 
recognized experts in the field of submarine TMA.  Shanteau 
and Stewart (1992) state that there are at least three good 
reasons why research on expert decision makers is 
important: generalizing of differences between naïve 
subjects and experts; advancement of expert systems through 
examination of those running the system; and, experts are 




It is not enough to assume there is a difference 
between recognized experts in a field of study, but to 
discover what exactly the differences are.  During the 
course of a study if similar behaviors are observed between 
participants than an argument for the universality of the 
observed behavior can be made.  The same goes for like 
behavior between participants in similar studies.  For 
example, if the majority of experts and novices make 
decisions in a similar way then we can establish guidelines 
that represent behavior for all participants. 
Analyses of experts provide an important means of 
establishing generality (Shanteau and Stewart, 1992). If 
there is a difference between the novice and expert 
participants then new guidelines need to be created.  These 
guidelines will be broader in scope and will account for 
all observed participants in both studies and in the 
working environment. 
b. Expert Systems 
“Expert systems are based on the codification of 
the knowledge and decision rules of experts” (Shanteau and 
Stewart, 1992, p. 101).  Studying experts is to capture the 
cognitive strategies they employ and use this understanding 
to develop tools to assist other decision makers (Shanteau 
and Stewart, 1992).  Systems that fall under this category 
of “tools” are designed to assist experts in their decision 
making or to make decisions that are comparable to those 
made by their human counterparts. 
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The design of an expert system involves an in-
depth study of how experts make their decisions.  The 
analysis of experts will give us a greater understanding of 
when and where these systems can be used (Shanteau, 1992a). 
Expert systems should have most of the compiled knowledge 
that experts have.  The knowledge and strategies employed 
by decision makers can be utilized to better represent data 
in expert systems.  Experts and novices use data 
differently so the way in which data is presented is a 
challenge.  These systems should be designed in a way that 
allows for flexibility in the processes employed to make 
decisions.  Human experts are flexible; a rigid system 
would best be used to simulate novices (Shanteau, 1989). 
c. Intrinsic Interest 
Many researchers are intrigued by domain experts 
and want to know more about how they make decisions 
(Shanteau and Stewart, 1992, p. 102). If it were indeed 
true that the best decisions are made only by experts then 
it may be assumed that the novices would want to emulate 
experts.  As a junior officer (novice submarine ship 
driver) this author always wanted to be like the senior 
officers (expert ship drivers).  I was always interested in 
their thought processes during exercises and how they 
produce accurate solutions for COI through the TMA process. 
The modern military relies on the judgments of 
expert decision makers to maintain a free state.  Surface 
and sub-surface ship drivers, war planners, physicians, and 
even individual members of a platoon are expected to make 
expert decisions.  These demands lead researchers to many 
unanswered questions such as: How good are these expert’s 
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decisions? Can their decision making skills be improved?  
What aids can be utilized to assist their decision making 
process? 
2. Challenges in Examining Expert Performance 
Identifying experts is the first challenge in 
conducting an experiment in this field of study (Edwards, 
1992).  Several approaches can be used to determine who 
qualifies as an expert (e.g., credentials).  It may be that 
those in a particular domain should define the experts 
(Shanteau, 1992a), or that it takes one to know one 
(Edwards, 1992). 
Once you have determined who the experts are, the 
second challenge is to gain access to them in order to 
study their decision making skills (Edwards, 1992). In 
order for experts to remain experts they must continually 
be involved in the field in which they work.  This amount 
of upkeep may change drastically between different fields 
of study but, “If you don’t use it you lose it.” 
The next, and last, challenge is to specify the 
measure of performance used to analyze the differences 
between participants (Edwards, 1992).  All of the 
challenges discussed above may be overcome with some well 
considered planning prior to a given study. 
3. Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy is defined as the confidence level in an 
individual’s ability to execute courses of action or to 
achieve a desired outcome in the face of adversity 
(Bandura, 1997.)  A low level of confidence will adversely 
affect the expected performance of an individual during 
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competition (Woodman and Hardy, 2003; Parfitt and Pates, 
1999).  There are several theories that explain this 
behavior.  Bandura suggests that those individuals with 
high self-efficacy – the belief that one can achieve what 
one sets out to do - are confident, effective, and 
generally more successful than those individuals with low 
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997). 
Bandura suggests that self-efficacy judgments are 
derived from four sources: performance accomplishments; 
vicarious experiences; verbal persuasion; and emotional 
arousal (Bandura, 1997).  It is the cognitive appraisal of 
the four sources of information that will either increase 
or decrease an individual’s level of self-efficacy and 
subsequent confidence. 
4. Cognitive Limitations of Experts 
Intelligent people have great difficulty judging 
probabilities, making predictions, and otherwise, 
attempting to cope with uncertainty (Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky, 1982).  These challenging aspects of decision 
making problems are a key explanation for why humans rely 
on judgmental heuristics (Slovic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein, 1985; Kahneman, et al., 1982; Wickens, et 
al., 2004; Dry, et al., 2005).  Although these heuristics 
are a functional tool used by the human brain to compensate 
for limited cognitive processing ability (Hutchins, 1996), 
they can lead to systematic biases and errors in judgment 
(Kahneman, et al., 1982).  These heuristics (or mental 
rules of thumb) may explain both the high and low levels of 
performance observed when experts make decisions (Shanteau, 
1988; Shanteau and Stewart, 1992). 
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Conducting TMA on individual contacts is a demanding 
task.  In the submarine community there are several courses 
on what is called “mental gym.”  This headache inducing 
“gymnasium” involves the application of recognized formulas 
to a specified scenario in a limited amount of time without 
using a calculator.  This work-out is the backbone of why 
submariners conduct ship operations safely. 
5. Characteristics of Experts 
Experts within similar domains may display similar 
psychological characteristics (Shanteau, 1988).  Experts 
within a given domain may experience similar schools or 
training.  All submarine officers attend similar schools 
during their careers.  The thought process and analysis 
patterns between experts are similar; however, individual 
experiences sharpen the skill differently.  The submariner 
TMA characteristics between experts are domain specific and 
will be similar because of the training requirements in 
their specified field.  This section contains a brief 
description of some psychological traits relevant to the 
experts in this study.  A more complete list can be 
reviewed in Shanteau (1987). 
Experts generally have highly developed perceptual/ 
attention abilities (Shanteau, 1988).  Few studies have 
shown how experts perceive uncertain data and how they 
produce effective decisions from those data.  It takes time 
to perform both the studying and practicing portion to a 
particular trade.  Any individual who has been practicing a 
trade for an extended period of time may qualify as an 
expert in that field.  With practice experts become able to 
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extract information that the non-experts just do not notice 
to be relevant (Shanteau, 1988). 
Experts have a sense of what is relevant and 
irrelevant (Shanteau, 1988).  When experts are given too 
much information they should be able to sift through the 
data and rely on the relevant information only.  Experts 
can determine relevant information because of the insight 
they have gained through experience in their fields 
(Shanteau, 1992b). 
Experts have an ability to simplify complex problems 
(Shanteau, 1988).  Breaking down the fundamentals of a game 
and making complex problems more simple, experts can then 
make better informed decisions.  In the game of chess, 
recognized experts, have superior pattern recognition 
capabilities that allow them to perform better (De Groot, 
1965). 
Experts are able to handle adversity better than non-
experts (Shanteau, 1988).  Experts work better under stress 
and make better decisions.  Given a scenario where there is 
uncertainty, the experts must determine relevant 
information (Shanteau, 1992b) to minimize mistakes in 
judgment. 
6. Strategies of Decision Making Experts 
While studying domain experts, many different 
strategies have been observed that lead to better 
decisions.  Experts are able to make adjustments during the 
decision making process and generally avoid large mistakes 
(Shanteau, 1988).  Domain experts use their experience to 
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continuously make decisions in an evolving situation 
several times over the course of a problem. 
For example, as soon as expert Texas Hold-Em poker 
players realize that their hand is no longer the best one, 
they will fold it right away to save themselves money.  The 
poker hand these “Pros” initially started with may have 
been the best one at the start of the round but by the time 
all the cards are showing on the table, their hands may be 
the worst. In this example, they must develop new decisions 
every time another card is exposed.  They will produce 
solutions that lead to the least error or will save/make 
them the most money. “When you feel that you are beaten, it 
is time to toss your pretty cards into the muck. It may 
seem silly to think that folding may be a key in your poker 
progression, but saving chips that should've been lost is 
the exact same as winning chips” (Carlisle, 2006). 
7. Is More Information Better for Expert Decision 
Makers? 
A study regarding the amount of information required 
by experts while making decisions, conducted by Ettenson, 
Shanteau, and Krogstad (1987), provides an interesting 
approach to quantifying the amount of information used.  
Their study suggested that it was not necessarily the 
quantity of information used by experts, but the ability of 
the expert to focus on what information was relevant.  
Three groups of auditors were required to made judgments on 
thirty-two individual cases based on eight dimensions of 




groups relied upon three factors out of the eight in order 
to make their judgments, less than half of the factors that 
were available to each group. 
The expert groups relied most heavily upon one single 
factor while other cues had secondary impacts.  There was 
no single cue that was dominant for the novice 
participants.  In conclusion, this study demonstrated that 
choosing to use less information was not a cognitive 
limitation but an indicator that the experts were able to 
focus on more relevant information.  Novices appeared to 
require more information (Ettenson, et al., 1987; Shanteau, 
1991).  Although each participant was given a wealth of 
information, much of it was not required and did not add to 
the performance of the three groups. 
In a later study, Shanteau states that “the amount of 
information used does not reflect degree of expertise; 
however, the type of information used does” (Shanteau, 
1992b, p. 2).  Shanteau also states that there is indeed a 
difference between mid-level and advanced experts because 
the advanced experts are better at evaluating which 
information is the most relevant (Shanteau, 1992b).  A 
question for further research is to evaluate the 
differences in decisions made between different levels of 
expertise. 
In support of Shanteau’s work, Omodei, McLennan, 
Elliott, Wearing, and Clancy (2005), state that more 
information is not necessarily better, especially given an 
adverse environment with uncertain conditions.  The 
consensus is still the same when expert decision makers are 
confronted with an environment that is “time-pressured, 
distributed, dynamic command environment characterized by 
uncertainty” (Omodei, et al., 2005, p. 39). 
8. Battle Command Decision-Making 
It is important to understand how an expert approaches 
a decision-making problem to better understand what we 
observe in the laboratory.  The concept of “mental models” 
(Serfaty, et al., 1997), is used to further explain how 
experts step through a decision making experience. 
In Figure 4, a five-step process is depicted in 
detail.  Mental models are an internal interpretation of 
what we experience in the real world.  As decision makers 
gain experience they ought to proceed through each step 
with a higher degree of certainty.  Initially we would 
expect the expert’s pattern-indexed memory to construct a 
better mental model of the situation. 
 
Figure 4.   Five Step Process for “Mental Model” Analysis. 
(From: Serfaty, et al., 1997.) 
 
In step 1, the expert may exhibit characteristics of a 
recognition-primed decision by generating an initial model 
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of what they have observing by recalling past experiences.  
In the next step, the expert formulates the right questions 
to ask in order to reduce uncertainty in his/her initial 
assumptions.  This may be done in a time-constrained 
environment. 
In step 3, the expert will now produce a model that is 
described as “rich” and “dynamic in space and time.”  This 
is the mental model that the expert will use to produce 
several different outcomes in step 4 and develop a plan of 
action in step 5.  The number of different outcome models 
is dependent on the experience level of the expert.  As 
experience is gained in real world situations experts can 
produce many more possible outcomes and have more possible 
plans from which to choose. 
Experts keep an extensive store of specific 
experiences in memory, supported by high-level principles 
taught in a classroom or on the job, that allow them to 
quickly develop a rough, still incomplete mental model for 
a new situation (Serfaty, et al., 1997).  These models are 
typically built on sound principles learned by the expert 
over time.  On any platform in the service, those 
individuals making decisions would expect some positive or 
negative feedback from individuals supporting them.  If an 
experts mental model is wrong than he/she may require some 
feedback in order to transform their model into a more 
accurate one. 
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The purpose of this research was to determine if there 
is a difference in decision making expertise between three 
different groups of submarine TMA subject matter experts 
(SMEs) when using a graphical display that depicts the AOU 
for the scenario.  The Java applicated, AOU study was used 
to simulate a submerged submarine scenario that involved 
several contacts of interest (COI).  Each participant was 
required to formulate the best possible solution, 
specifically range, for one selected contact using the 
displayed AOU.  The end result was to be either a 
satisfactory firing solution or coming to periscope depth. 
The experiment included two scenarios, (i.e., 
targeting and navigation), and two color schemes for each 
scenario.  One scenario had a bright center and dark edge, 
the other had a dark center and a bright edge.  All 
scenarios had multiple contacts with at least one 
overlapping AOU. 
Administering the four individual scenarios to each of 
the thirty participants (ten from each SME group), the 
hypothesis that there is a difference between the three 
SMEs can be tested.  This chapter describes the process 
used to simulate the four scenarios, experimental design, 
participants, apparatus, procedure, and data collection. 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The experimental task was to evaluate participants who 
observe a simulation of a submerged submarine which 
involved AOUs for several contacts.  Each participant was 
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to formulate the best possible solution for a specific COI 
using the designated AOU.  If there is a difference between 
experts it would be because of any confounding variables. 
Two different scenario backgrounds were presented to 
each participant.  In the first scenario each participant 
was to use the information presented by the AOU to evaluate 
the COI and report when they felt their solution was 
accurate enough to man battle stations and attack.  In the 
second scenario each participant was required to use the 
information provided by the AOU to evaluate the COI and 
determine when it was safe for the submarine to proceed to 
periscope depth (PD). 
Each of the scenarios required extensive calculations 
and application of the decision making process employed to 
conduct TMA by the participant.   The only data provided 
were the uncertainty ellipses displayed in the specified 
AOU.  Each scenario (attack and PD) had two different 
simulations available for a total of four different 
scenarios.  Each participant engaged in all four scenarios 
as well as a practice scenario. 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
A total of 30 participants volunteered for the 
experiment.  All were either U.S. Naval officers or 
enlisted submarine members.  Two sites were visited in 
order to obtain enough individuals for each group of SMEs.  
Three CO/XO, eight DH, and ten FTs were participants in 
Groton, CT while all other participants were observed in 
Bangor, WA.  Groton is known as the “submarine capital of 
the world” and is the home for many of the schools relating 
to the submarine service.  The administering officer for 
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this study coordinated times for conducting the experiment 
that coincided with the participants schedules. 
The CO/XO participants, on average, were ten years 
older than the FT participants and five years older than 
the DH participants.  The CO/XO participants were also the 
most educated of all participants with 80% of them having 
received a Master’s Degree. 
1. FT Participants 
FT participants were selected using two criteria.  
First, each participant had to be a second class petty 
officer or above.  Second, each participant had to have 
been an instructor at a FT school.  The reason for these 
criteria was to ensure that the participants from this 
group had enough experience in the field of TMA to be 
considered an Expert.  FT participant ages ranged from 26 
to 37 years, with the average age being 33.7 years. 
2. DH Participants 
The Submarine Officer Advanced Course (SOAC) was the 
main source for the DH participants.  Upon graduation from 
SOAC these Lieutenants proceed to the fleet to become 
Navigator, Weapons, or Engineering officers onboard 
submarine platforms.  The DH participants from SOAC had yet 
to serve as an actual DH on a submarine.  Several DH 
participants had already served as a DH on a submarine.  DH 
participant ages ranged from 26 to 37 years, with the 




3. CO/XO Participants 
The CO/XO participants were selected using one 
criterion.  The CO/XO participants had to have graduated 
from the Pre-Executive Officer School (PXO).  Two of the 
CO/XO participants recently graduated from the PXO course 
while the rest of the CO/XO participants were stationed on 
submarines or had completed their submarine tour as a CO or 
XO.  CO/XO participant ages ranged from 34 to 44 years, 
with an average age of 39 years. 
C. APPARATUS 
1. Laptop Computer 
The test apparatus consisted of a Pentium II 2GHz 
laptop computer.  The laptop computer was placed on a 
standard sized desk with normal lighting conditions.  
Figure 5 depicts a demonstration of how a participant may 
have conducted the experiment.  The exact location for each 
participant varied.  Participants observed the scenarios 
from their work offices, hotel rooms, or in one case, their 
own home. 
 Figure 5.   Example of the Experimental Setup. 
 
2. Surveys 
Four different surveys were completed by each 
participant.  All of the surveys were designed by this 
author and his advisor with the exception of the NASA Task 
Load Index (TLX) survey. 
a. Biographical Data Survey (Appendix A) 
The goal of this survey was to collect basic 
information such as rank, rate, age, etc. 
b. Scenario Survey (Appendix B) 
The goal of this survey was to collect 
participant solutions for the scenarios and to determine 




c. NASA Task Load Index (Appendix C) 
The TLX is a subjective workload assessment tool.  
It is compromised of six subscales that measure Mental 
Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, Effort, 
Performance, and Frustration. 
d. Post-Scenario Questionnaire (Appendix D) 
The goal of this questionnaire was to gather 
information that may have affected the decision making of 
the participants during the experiment.  The information 
obtained from these questionnaires will be used when 
designing future submarine displays. 
D. PROCEDURE 
1. Surveys 
Upon arrival, participants were required to read and 
sign the consent form in APPENDIX F.  The protocol used to 
perform the testing is in APPENDIX E.  In order to ensure 
each participant experienced the same situation the written 
protocol form in APPENDIX E was used by the administering 
officer.  Participants were provided an overview of the 
study as well as being informed that their data would be 
compared with two other groups of participants representing 
two other groups of experts.  The researcher explained that 
a 95% ellipse for a given contact meant that the contact 
had a probability that it was located within that 
particular ellipse 95% of the time and outside the ellipse 
5% of the time. 
Participants then observed the practice scenario to 
familiarize themselves with the format and to provide them 
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with examples of ellipses.  The administering officer used 
Appendix E in order to fully explain the format of the GUI 
display and controls.  Participants were given as much time 
as necessary to ask questions and ensure they were 
comfortable with the display format. 
Once a scenario began it could only be stopped when 
the participant conducted the TMA and produced a solution 
for the COI.  If the participants did not manually stop the 
scenario by selecting the stop button (see Figure 10 
ellipse C) then the screen would go blank and he would be 
required to report his solution (this happened six times). 
Appendix B contains the four scenario examples.  The 
scenarios were presented in a partially randomized manner.  
The order was limited to a total of eight different 
sequences.  Scenarios One and Three were similar with the 
exception that Three was skewed 228 degrees.  Scenarios Two 
and Four were similar with the exception that Four was were 
skewed 62 degrees.  To prevent the participant from 
noticing a similarity between any skewed scenario pair, no 
paired scenarios were presented back-to-back. 
Upon completion of each scenario, participants filled 
out Appendices B and C.  Each Scenario Survey requested a 
Range, Range +/-, Bearing, Bearing +/-, Course, and Course 
+/-.  Several questions pertained to the weight individuals 
placed upon certain factors during their decision making.  
For example, on a scale from one to ten (ten being the most 
important) how much did the safety of the ship weigh in 
your decision? 
As stated above, the NASA Task Load Index (Appendix B) 
was completed after each scenario.  The same sheet of paper 
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was used for all four scenarios.  When a participant placed 
a mark on the scale he would use the scenario number as a 
mark.  For example, if the participant felt a high level of 
Mental Demand for scenario Three then he would mark a three 
on the scale close to the high end of the scale.  On a 
subsequent scenario, if the participant felt the same level 
of mental demand then he would place that scenario number 
at the same place on the scale. 
Upon completing all four scenarios and all of the 
surveys attached to those scenarios, the participants 
completed the Post Scenario Survey (Appendix D).  The Post 
Scenario Survey assessed the overall experience from each 
participant for all four scenarios.  These questions 
focused on the confidence level of each participant in 
using an AOU to assess range estimates and the 
participant’s experience with regard to TMA decision 
making. 
2. Scenarios 
The process of generating scenarios was extensive.  
The same format used by Kirschenbaum and Arruda (1994) was 
used in the current research.  A meeting between the 
author, Susan Kirschenbaum, Wendy Berube, and Sandie Grage 
was conducted at NUWC several months before the experiment 
was conducted.  The JAVA coded simulation was provided by 
Ms. Berube and the displays were produced by Ms. Sandie 
Grage.  Susan Kirschenbaum provided the background 




a. JAVA Simulation Code 
The Java simulation code consists of three files: 
Main.java, AouJFrame.java, and ImagesFrame.java.  Main.java 
is the class that is called first and instantiates the 
AouJFrame class.  Once the AouJFrame is instantiated, all 
the components (panels, text, labels, buttons, etc) for the 
graphical user interface (GUI) are displayed and 
initialized.  The AouJFrame file also includes the methods 
for opening the output file once the enter button is 
selected and writing output data to it when the stop button 
is selected.  Lastly, this file contains methods to write 
the ownship and target position data which corresponds to 
the displays which depict the AOUs for the targets.  The 
ImagesFrame.java file first creates a background thread to 
improve efficiency and then displays the AOU displays 
sequentially every 10 seconds.  The Java class MediaTracker 
includes built-in functions which handle displaying images. 
b. Displays 
The four scenarios used during the research were 
generated from two initial scenarios.  Each initial 
scenario was skewed either 228 or 62 degrees for the odd 
and even scenarios respectively to produce a total of four 
scenarios.  Ms. Sandie Grage and some military advisors 
generated the geometries for the two scenarios.  These 
scenarios were created by a hypothetical periscope and 
targeting scenario whiteboard discussion.  Once the 
scenarios were generated, the information (such as target 
initial bearing, range, course, speed, and ownship 
maneuvers) was given to a technician who coded the 
scenarios in a TI-04 simulator. 
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The scenarios were run through the TI-04 system 
and the outputted data were collected.  Data extracted from 
the collected output were placed into a functional database 
and then a Matlab script was created to extract information 
for ownship, target, and AOU data.  A state estimation 
algorithm, Nodestar, was used to calculate contact 
solutions for the scenarios.  A Matlab script was used to 
convert the extracted information and draw the display 
figures.  The displays were drawn and depicted ownship 
position, each target's position, each target's AOU, and 
range rings. 
c. Scenario Generation 
To run the Java application, a Java Software 
Development Kit (SDK) was installed on a laptop computer.  
All files for the program were stored in a folder for easy 
access before and after the scenarios were run.  Before 
each scenario was run, the participant number and the 
scenario was entered into the file name section of Figure 
6.  For example, “001TarYelNov25DH” would be the file name 
for the first participant, targeting scenario with the 
yellow centered AOU, administered on the 25th of November, 
to a department head SME. 
 
Figure 6.   Mission Selector for the AOU Study. 
 
To begin each scenario, after entering the file 
name and selecting a mission, the administering officer 
would select the enter button in Figure 6.  The scenario 
would begin and display a new display every ten seconds.  
When a satisfactory solution for the COI was determined by 
the participant, he stops the scenario by selecting the 
stop button in Figure 10, ellipse C.  When the stop button 
was selected the following information was saved in a 
specified file location: scenario, subject number, start 
time, and stop time. 
d. Scenario Description 
A total of four scenarios were generated for the 
present research.  Appendix B contains the four handouts 
given to the participants before each of the four 
scenarios.  The Yellow Centered Targeting Mission was 
scenario One.  The Yellow Centered Navigation Mission was 
scenario Two.  The Red Centered Targeting Mission was 
scenario Three. The Red Centered Navigation Mission was 
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scenario Four.  Although there were multiple AOUs in each 
scenario, each participant was instructed to analyze only 
the AOU assigned to the COI. 
Each scenario included a total of ninety 
individual displays.  The GUI formatted, JAVA coded program 
presented each display to the participant in a specified 
order that simulated the motion of all contact’s AOUs.  All 
contact AOUs originated in the center of the screen and 
within the first minute of each scenario the AOUs would 
steadily migrate out to a realistic location.  Each 
participant was told that they must wait for the first two 
minutes of each scenario (which included 12 slides) before 
they could begin trusting the AOU data locations. 
Figure 7 is an example of a yellow centered AOU 
display.  Figure 8 is a red centered AOU display that is 
similar to the display in Figure 7 with the exception that 
it is skewed sixty-two degrees to produce a different even 
scenario.  In Figure 7 there are five individual AOUs 
present.  Each AOU is labeled S1 through S5 respectively 
and each AOU has several different probability ellipses 
available for evaluation.  Different colors are used to 
indicate probabilities that the contact is located inside 
that AOU.  The red ellipse indicates there is a 95% 
probability that S4 is located within the red and yellow 
rings combined.  The yellow ellipse represents a 66% 
probability that S4 is located in the yellow ring only. 
 
Figure 7.   Yellow Centered AOU Scenario Display. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Red Centered AOU Scenario Display. 
 
Relative motion was simulated by the Java coded 
program displaying subsequent displays during a scenario.  
Figure 7 and Figure 9 depict examples of subsequent 
displays.  Figure 7 would be displayed first and ten 
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seconds later Figure 9 would be displayed.  When reviewing 
the two displays notice the difference in S4’s location.  
In Figure 7, the right edge of S4’s AOU is positioned at 
the ten thousand yard range ring.  In Figure 9 the right 
edge of S4’s AOU is now positioned half way between the ten 
thousand and five thousand yard range rings.  This 
difference between Figure 7 and Figure 9 would simulate S4 
moving toward the center of the screen. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Yellow Centered AOU Scenario Display Subsequent to 
the Jpeg in Figure 7. 
 
e. Practice Scenario 
A practice scenario allowed participants to 
familiarize themselves with the controls of the program and 
the simulation format.  The practice scenario included an 
in-depth explanation of the controls and setup of the 
program.  This practice scenario was similar to that used 
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by Kirschenbaum and Arruda (1994) and was essentially a 
walk through by the administering officer. 
Figure 10 is a screenshot of the practice 
scenario that was viewed by each participant.  The 
simulated ownship marker during all scenarios was at the 
center of the screen.  Four range rings, valued at five 
thousand yards apiece, for a total of twenty thousand yards 
surrounded the ownship marker.  Ellipse A, in Figure 10, is 
an enlarged ownship marker at the center of the screen. 
Ellipse B in Figure 10 is an enlarged display of 
ownship speed and course, as well as a COI solution 
generated by a fire control computer is shown.  The 
generated fire control solution was explained to each 
participant as a solution that would be generated by a fire 
control technician onboard a submarine while underway.  
This generated solution was not to be considered as truth 
but more of an assistant to the participant. 
Ellipse C in Figure 10 is an enlarged stop 
button.  When the participant was comfortable with his 
solution for the COI he was instructed to click on the stop 
button using the mouse pointer.  Each participant was 
toldto remember his COI solution before selecting stop 
because when the stop button was selected the screen would 
disappear. 
 
Figure 10.   Example of the Practice Scenario Screenshot with 
Individual Sections Outlined and Magnified. 
 
E. DATA ENTRY AND FORMATTING 
The data (Appendix B) needed to be transformed prior 
to analysis.  Data formatting for expertise, time, and 
range are described in the following sub-sections.  The 
corresponding data are provided in Appendices M through P. 
1. Expertise 
SMEs were grouped based on their level of expertise.  
The SMEs were FTs (Group One), DHs (Group Two), and COs/XOs 
(Group Three).  With ten participants in each group, 
therewere 30 data points for each scenario.  The three 
different groups of expertise were recorded in the expert 




The length of time each participant took to complete a 
scenario required two conversions in order to analyze the 
data correctly.  The first conversion required the output 
of the Java program to be rounded down to the nearest ten 
seconds.  This rounding was done because each new display 
was presented in ten seconds increments during the 
scenario.  If a participant selected the stop button at 
00:10:45 (ten minutes and forty five seconds) then he based 
his solution on the display at 00:10:40 (ten minutes and 
forty seconds).  The second conversion was required to 
convert a 00:00:00 formatted time into a number with three 
decimal places.  For example, 00:07:40 would convert to 
7.667 minutes.  This converted time is recorded in the time 
column of Appendices M through P. 
3. Range 
The range data lists what each participant believed 
the correct range to the COI was at the time he stopped the 
scenario.  Range differences were calculated by comparing 
the reported range for the COI by the participant to the 
actual range of the contact.  These ranges were recorded in 
thousands of yards (Kyards).  Column five was used for the 
analysis of range differences between different levels of 
expertise in Appendices M through P. 
The range +/-, within range, over or under variables 
in columns four, six, and seven, respectively, were also 
used to analyze how accurate the different experts were in 
estimating ranges for the COI.  The range +/- variable 
requires the participant to calculate an acceptable 
variability in range estimates for the COI.  A relatively 
 60
large range envelope would be an advantage over one with 
smaller range envelope.  For example, a range envelope that 
is four miles long has a greater probability of 
encompassing the COI than a range envelope that is one 
mile.  The over or under variable represents a 
participant’s response that was an over-estimated range. 
4. Example of Data Formatting 
A reported range estimate of 10.0 Kyards (10,000) with 
a variable range +/- equal to 3.0 Kyards (3,000) at time 
00:10:40 would represent a total range envelope between 7.0 
Kyards (7,000) and 13.0 Kyards (13,000).  The COI, in this 
example, is located at 11.0 Kyards (11,000) from ownship. 
The calculated range difference would be 1.000 Kyards 
(1000).  In Appendices M through P, a “1” is listed for the 
within range variable because the COI was located within 
the range envelope.  Since the reported range of 10,000 
yards is less than the actual range of 11,000 yards a “0” 
is listed for the over or under variable because the COI 
the range estimate was an under-estimated range. 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This section outlines the statistical analyses 
performed on the data.  Section B describes the formatting 
required to analyze the data.  Section C provides the 
analysis of the scenarios.  Table 1 is an example of how 
the data are summarized for each section’s analysis. 
Scenario X 
  CO/XO DH FT 
P-
Value 
Time (minutes)     
Range (Kyards)     
Within Range     
Range Envelope (Kyards)     
Over or Under     
Table 1.   Example of How Data are Presented for each 
Scenario. 
 
Several surveys were used to acquire the data to be 
analyzed.  Biographical data are reported in Appendix A.  
Appendix B includes the performance data on all four 
scenarios.  Appendix C includes the NASA Task Load Index 
(TLX) which used to assess the workload of the 
participants. 
Hypothesis 1 states there is a difference between the 
groups of SMEs with respect to their ability to estimate 
ranges to a COI when presented with uncertain data.  
Performance of the three groups was compared on the 
following variables: time to estimate range, range 
estimations, the proportion of ranges that were within a 
specified range envelope, and whether or not a range 
estimate was over-estimated or under-estimated. 
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B. RESULTS 
1. Scenario I 
Scenario One was a time sensitive scenario.  No 
differences between the experts were noted.  Appendix B 
describes the scenario in detail; Appendix K contains the 
TLX and personal preferences for all participants.  Table 2 
provides a summary of the Scenario One data. 
Scenario One 
  CO/XO DH FT 
P-
Value 
Time 7.06 9.067 9.617  
Range 1.310 0.876 1.731 > .05 
Within Range 5 6 3 > .05 
Range Envelope 0.88 0.95 1.025 > .05 
Over or Under 4 3 3 > .05 
Table 2.   Mean Performance Data for Three Groups of Experts 
for Scenario One. 
 
a. Time Comparison for Groups of Experts 
A test for equal variance revealed that the data 
was not normally distributed (Bartlett’s Test: test 
statistic = 6.18, p < .05).  A boxplot in Figure 11 
presents variances between groups of experts.  The CO/XO 
SMEs completed Scenario One fastest while reporting the 
lowest time constraint pressure on the NASA TLX.  The CO/XO 
group reported a mean of 5.5 (out of 10).  The mean time 











Boxplot of Time versus Expert for Scenario One
 
Figure 11.   Boxplot of Time versus Expert for Scenario One 
 
b. Range Difference Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
A test for equal variance revealed that the data 
was normally distributed (Bartlett’s Test: test statistic = 
3.51, p > .05).  A one-way ANOVA revealed there were no 
significant differences between expert groups regarding 
estimating ranges to a COI F(2,29)=.23, p > .05.  There is 
one range difference (highlighted on Appendix M) that is 
three standard deviations from the mean, therefore, is 
considered an outlier.  A second one-way ANOVA produced 
similar results.  Expertise was not a factor when 
estimating ranges to a COI, F(2,29)=1.25, p > .05. 
The DH SMEs reported COI solutions with the least 
amount of range difference.  DH experts reported ranges 
that were approximately 400 and 800 yards more accurate 
than the CO/XO and FT experts, respectively.  The DH 
experts also reported the lowest personal experience (5.1 
out of 10) and confidence in solution (1.4 out of 4) on 
Appendix B’s personal traits section.  See Appendix K for 
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details.  The overall means for personal experience and 
confidence in solutions were 6.0 and 2.0, respectively. 
c. Within Range Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
The DH and CO/XO experts reported range envelopes 
that contained the COI 50% of the time or better.  The FT 
experts report range envelopes that contained the COI 30% 
of the time.  Regression was used to determine if there was 
a significant difference between expert groups with regard 
to reporting a range envelope that contained the COI.  
There was no evidence that expertise was a factor in range 
envelope accuracy (test that all slopes are zero: G = 
0.809, df = 1, p = 0.368). 
d. Range Envelope Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
A one-way ANOVA revealed there was no significant 
difference between expert groups regarding the size of 
range envelope estimates for the COI F(2,29)=.26, p > .05. 
e. Over or Under Estimate Comparison for Groups 
of Experts 
The DH and FT expert groups over-estimated the 
range to the COI 30% of the time while the CO/XO expert 
group overestimated the range to the COI 40% of the time.  
Regression was used to determine if there was a significant 
difference between expert groups regarding reported over-
estimated or under-estimated ranges to the COI.  There is 
no evidence that expertise was a factor in over-estimating 
or under-estimating ranges to a COI (test that all slopes 
are zero: G = 0.226, df = 1, p = 0.635). 
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2. Scenario II 
Scenario Two was not as time intensive as both 
Scenarios One and Four.  No differences between the experts 
were noted.  Appendix B describes the scenario in detail; 
Appendix L contains the TLX and personal preferences for 
all participants.  Table 3 provides a summary of the 
Scenario Two data. 
Scenario Two 
  CO/XO DH FT 
P-
Value 
Time 4.614 6.047 5.583 > .05 
Range 4.355 3.968 4.786 > .05 
Within Range 2 3 1 > .05 
Range Envelope 2.49 2.35 2.1 > .05 
Over or Under 0 1 0 > .05 
Table 3.   Mean Performance Data for Three Groups of Experts 
for Scenario Two. 
 
a. Time Comparison for Groups of Experts 
A test for equal variance revealed that the data 
was normally distributed (Bartlett’s Test: test statistic = 
1.25, p > .05).  A one-way ANOVA revealed there were no 
significant differences between expert groups regarding the 
length of time it took for them to generate their COI 
solutions F(2,29)=.78, p > .05.  The CO/XO SMEs completed 
Scenario Two fastest while reporting the lowest time 
constraint pressure on the NASA TLX.  The CO/XO group 
reported a mean of 5.6 (out of 10).  The mean time pressure 
for all participants was 5.7. 
b. Range Difference Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
A test for equal variance revealed that the data 
was normally distributed (Bartlett’s Test: test statistic = 
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1.81, p > .05).  A one-way ANOVA revealed there were no 
significant differences between expert groups regarding 
estimating ranges to a COI F(2,29)=.39, p > .05. 
The DH SMEs reported COI solutions with the least 
amount of range difference.  DH experts reported ranges 
that were approximately 400 and 800 yards more accurate 
then the CO/XO and FT experts, respectively.  The DH 
experts also reported the lowest personal experience (5.5 
out of 10) and confidence in solution (2.1 out of 4) on 
Appendix B’s personal traits section.  See Appendix L for 
details.  The overall means for personal experience and 
confidence in solutions were 6.2 and 2.3, respectively. 
c. Within Range Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
The DH and CO/XO experts reported range envelopes 
that contained the COI 30% and 20% of the time, 
respectively.  The FT experts report range envelopes that 
contained the COI 10% of the time.  Regression was used to 
determine if there was a significant difference between 
expert groups with regard to reporting a range envelope 
that contains the COI.  Approximately 20% of the total 
participants reported range envelopes that contained the 
COI.  There was no evidence that expertise was a factor in 
range envelope accuracy (test that all slopes are zero: G = 
0.314, df = 1, p = 0.575). 
d. Range Envelope Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
A one-way ANOVA revealed there was no significant 
difference between expert groups regarding the size of 
range envelope estimates for the COI F(2,29)=.28, p > .05.
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e. Over or Under Estimate Comparison for Groups 
of Experts 
Regression was used to determine if there was a 
significant difference between expert groups regarding 
reported over-estimated or under-estimated ranges to the 
COI.  One participant over-estimated the range to the COI.  
There is no evidence that expertise was a factor in over-
estimating or under-estimating ranges to a COI (test that 
all slopes are zero: G = 0.000, df = 1, p = 1.000). 
3. Scenario III 
Scenario Three was not as time intensive as both 
Scenarios One and Four.  One difference between the experts 
was noted.  A difference between DH and FT SMEs is accuracy 
of range envelopes.  Appendix B describes the scenario in 
detail; Appendix M contains the TLX and personal 
preferences for all participants.  Table 4 provides a 
summary of the Scenario Three data. 
Scenario Three 
  CO/XO DH FT 
P-
Value 
Time 8.213 8.344 9.53 > .05 
Range 1.603 1.082 1.654 > .05 
Within Range 3 5 1 < .05 
Range Envelope 0.965 1.05 0.9 > .05 
Over or Under 3 3 2 > .05 
Table 4.   Mean Performance Data for Three Groups of Experts 
for Scenario Three. 
 
a. Time Comparison for Groups of Experts 
A test for equal variance revealed that the data 
was normally distributed (Bartlett’s Test: test statistic = 
.58, p > .05).  A one-way ANOVA revealed there were no 
significant differences between expert groups regarding the 
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length of time it took for them to generate their COI 
solutions F(2,28)=.45, p > .05.  The CO/XO SMEs completed 
Scenario Three fastest while reporting the lowest time 
constraint pressure on the NASA TLX.  The CO/XO group 
reported a mean of 5.1 (out of 10).  The mean time pressure 
for all participants was 5.9. 
b. Range Difference Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
A test for equal variance revealed that the data 
was normally distributed (Bartlett’s Test: test statistic = 
2.09, p > .05).  A one-way ANOVA revealed there were no 
significant differences between expert groups regarding 
estimating ranges to a COI F(2,29)=.23, p > .05. 
The DH SMEs reported COI solutions with the least 
amount of range difference.  DH experts reported ranges 
that were approximately 600 yards more accurate than the 
CO/XO and FT experts.  The DH experts also reported the 
lowest personal experience (4.1 out of 10) and confidence 
in solution (1.5 out of 4) on Appendix B’s personal traits 
section.  See Appendix M for details.  The overall means 
for personal experience and confidence in solutions were 
5.4 and 1.9, respectively. 
c. Within Range Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
The DH experts reported range envelopes that 
contained the COI 50% of the time while CO/XO experts 
reported range envelops that contained the COI 30% of the 
time.  Regression was used to determine if there was a 
significant difference between expert groups with regard to 
reporting a range envelope that contains the COI.  There 
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was no evidence that expertise was a factor in range 
envelope accuracy (test that all slopes are zero: G = 
0.963, df = 1, p = 0.326), however, the goodness-of-fit 
tests revealed that there was sufficient evidence for the 
model not fitting the data adequately.  Three additional 
regressions were analyzed with regard to reporting range 
envelopes that contain the COI. 
A regression between expert groups one and two 
revealed there is a difference regarding range envelope 
accuracy (test that all slopes are zero: G = 4.070, df = 1, 
p = 0.044).  A regression between expert groups two and 
three revealed there is no difference regarding range 
envelope accuracy (test that all slopes are zero: G = 
0.840, df = 1, p = 0.359).  A regression between expert 
groups one and three revealed there is no difference 
regarding range envelope accuracy (test that all slopes are 
zero: G = 1.297, df = 1, p = 0.255). 
d. Range Envelope Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
A one-way ANOVA revealed there was no significant 
difference between expert groups regarding the size of 
range envelope estimates for the COI F(2,29)=.15, p > .05.  
There is one range envelope (highlighted on Appendix M) 
that is three standard deviations from the mean, therefore, 
is considered an outlier.  The participant who recorded the 
range envelope outlier also scored a range difference of 
3.962.  No further analysis was done because the larger 
range envelope did not provide any benefit to the 
participants within range results. 
 70
e. Over or Under Estimate Comparison for Groups 
of Experts 
All three experts over-estimated the range to the 
COI approximately 30% of the time.  Regression was used to 
determine if there was a significant difference between 
expert groups regarding reported over-estimated or under-
estimated ranges to the COI.  There is no evidence that 
expertise was a factor in over-estimating or under-
estimating ranges to a COI (test that all slopes are zero: 
G = 0.257, df = 1, p = 0.613). 
4. Scenario IV 
Scenario Four was a time sensitive scenario.  One 
difference between the experts was noted.  No differences 
between the experts were noted.  Appendix B describes the 
scenario in detail; Appendix N contains the TLX and 
personal preferences for all participants.  Table 5 
provides a summary of the Scenario Four data. 
Scenario Four 
  CO/XO DH FT 
P-
Value 
Time 4.844 2.933 4.747 > .05 
Range 5.097 3.772 4.976 > .05 
Within Range 1 4 1 > .05 
Range Envelope 2.35 2.17 1.95 > .05 
Over or Under 0 2 0 > .05 
Table 5.   Mean Performance Data for Three Groups of Experts 
for Scenario Four. 
 
a. Time Comparison for Groups of Experts 
A test for equal variance revealed that the data 
was normally distributed (Bartlett’s Test: test statistic = 
2.96, p > .05).  A one-way ANOVA revealed there were no 
significant differences between expert groups regarding the 
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length of time it took for them to generate their COI 
solutions F(2,29)= 1.74, p > .05.  The DH SMEs completed 
Scenario Four fastest.  The DH group reported a mean of 7.7 
(out of 10).  The mean time pressure for all participants 
was 7.7. 
b. Range Difference Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
A test for equal variance revealed that the data 
was normally distributed (Bartlett’s Test: test statistic = 
1.43, p > .05).  A one-way ANOVA revealed there were no 
significant differences between expert groups regarding 
estimating ranges to a COI F(2,29)= 1.09, p > .05. 
The DH SMEs reported COI solutions with the least 
amount of range difference.  DH experts reported ranges 
that were approximately 1300 and 1200 yards more accurate 
then the CO/XO and FT experts, respectively.  The DH 
experts also reported the lowest personal experience (4.3 
out of 10) and confidence in solution (1.7 out of 4) on 
Appendix B’s personal traits section.  See Appendix N for 
details.  The overall means for personal experience and 
confidence in solutions were 5.7 and 2.0, respectively. 
c. Within Range Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
The DH experts reported range envelopes that 
contained the COI 40% of the time and the CO/XO and FT 
experts reported range envelops that contained the COI 10% 
of the time.  Regression was used to determine if there was 
a significant difference between expert groups with regard 
to reporting a range envelope that contains the COI.  There 
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was no evidence that expertise was a factor in range 
envelope accuracy (test that all slopes are zero: G = 
2.532, df = 1, p = .112). 
d. Range Envelope Comparison for Groups of 
Experts 
A one-way independent ANOVA indicates there were 
no significant differences between expert groups regarding 
the size of range envelope estimates for the COI 
F(2,29)=.22, p > .05. 
e. Over or Under Estimate Comparison for Groups 
of Experts 
Regression was used to determine if there was a 
significant difference between expert groups regarding 
reported over-estimated or under-estimated ranges to the 
COI.  Two participants over-estimated the range to the COI.  
There is no evidence that expertise was a factor in over-
estimating or under-estimating ranges to a COI (test that 
all slopes are zero: G = 0.000, df = 1, p = 1.000). 
5. Experiment Progression 
a. Range Difference Comparison as the 
Experiment Progressed 
The analysis in this section does not consider the 
participants.  The participant scores were combined for 
each scenario progression.  A test for equal variance 
revealed that the data was normally distributed (Bartlett’s 
Test: test statistic = 2.60, p > .05).  A one-way ANOVA 
revealed there were no significant differences between 
scenarios as the experiment progressed regarding range 
estimations F(3,119)=.40, p > .05.  This result is contrary 
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to any assumption that the participants range estimation 
should get better as they experience more AOU scenarios. 
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V.  SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
There is no significant difference between the expert 
groups when it came to generating range solutions to a COI. 
There was a significant difference between the DH and FT 
expert groups within range estimates. 
B. DISCUSSION 
1. No Range Accuracy Significant Difference 
While the sample of DH experts in the current study 
reported more accurate range estimates than the other two 
expert groups, this difference was not statistically 
significant.  It is possible that AOUs do not provide 
enough information for SMEs to develop solutions that are 
significantly different.  All officers receive the same TMA 
training during their careers.  Logically the CO/XO SMEs 
should report more accurate ranges to a COI when given 
similar conditions as the DH and FT SMEs. 
Shanteau has done extensive research in the behavior 
of experts.  Experts within similar domains display similar 
psychological characteristics and have a sense of what is 
relevant or irrelevant (Shanteau, 1988).  Shanteau also 
states that there is indeed a difference between mid-level 
and advanced in that the advanced experts are better at 
evaluating which information is the most relevant 
(Shanteau, 1992b). 
No differences between SMEs were observed because AOUs 
alone do not provide enough information to develop 
solutions that are representative of the expert’s ability.  
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The AOU provides a minimal amount of data with a high 
degree of uncertainty.  The solutions generated by the SMEs 
are just as uncertain as the data from which they were 
generated.  AOUs that are accompanied by additional 
information such as bearing rate and bearings would be a 
better use of an expert’s TMA abilities. 
2. Range Envelope Significant Differences 
A significant difference was noted between the DH and 
FT experts regarding the ability to develop range envelopes 
that contain the COI.  The DHs were able to generate ranges 
to the COI that were 800 yard more accurate than the FT 
experts.  The DHs utilization of a slightly larger range 
envelope (1.63 Kyards) when compared to the FT experts 
(1.49Kyards) along with their more accurate range 
estimations is the reason for the significant difference. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Future Decision Aids 
The results of the current study demonstrate that 
there are no differences between SMEs regarding range 
accuracies given an AOU so any decision aid produced would 
be applicable to all users, regardless of their expertise.  
The information obtained in the post scenario questionnaire 
(Appendix D) is invaluable in the development of a new 
decision aid.  Two examples of requested information that 
could be displayed with an AOU is bearing rate and AOU 
history.  Bearing rates are a key ingredient in 
understanding relative motion between a COI and ownship.  
AOU history provides a track of the COI’s relative motion. 
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2. Future Studies 
I recommend a study that presents a COIs bearing rate, 
bearing, AOU, and AOU history to expert groups to those 
used in the current study.  The recommended study should 
have more than ten participants in each expert group.  The 
requirements for these participants should meet or exceed 
the requirements used in the current study.  It is 
suggested that “the amount of information used does not 
reflect degree of expertise; however, the type of 
information used does” (Shanteau, 1992b, p. 2).  In this 
future study more information would be presented to three 
groups of SMEs allowing for results that may or may not 
support the findings in the current study. 
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APPENDIX A: BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 
Biographical Data. Subject #_____ 
1. Age:       
 
2. Education Year Degree Major 
High School:                                             
Under graduate:                                          
Graduate:                                                
Post graduate:                                           
 
3. Navy Experience 
Rank        
Years in the Navy        
Time at sea (Months)        
Time since last sea tour (Months)        
 
4. Combat Systems  
List the combat Systems you have most recently used Dates used 
                                              
                                              
                                              
5. Add any other relevant experience you feel may have affected your results.  
For example, being an Instructor or having a lot of experience in high density 
areas while being submerged. 
                                                                               
                                                                               
             
6. List schools attended that have developed your TMA skills.  
                                                                               
                                                                               
                                                          
7. Are you Introverted or Extroverted? _______________ 
8. Email address __________________________ 
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APPENDIX B: FOUR SCENARIOS 
Scenario 1 
In this scenario you are required to proceed to PD in an expeditious way.  The 
submarine is required to receive the next broadcast and you must use caution, but at the 
same time proceed as quickly as possible.  Stop the scenario once you are ready to 
proceed to PD. 
What was your final solution for the COI?  
Range       + or -      , Bearing       + or -      , Course       + or -       
 
Using a range between 1 and 10 (10 being the most), to answer how much each factor weighed 
in your decision making. 
Safety of ship _____ (Do not want to sink the ship) 
Job Satisfaction _____ (You have trained hard so show it) 
Job Security/ Promotion _____ (Do not want to be relieved or demoted for collision) 
Letting down the team _____ (Everyone is counting on you to make a good decision) 
Mission Accomplishment _____ (Be the best boat on the waterfront) 
Personal Satisfaction _____ (You do everything well, even taking out the trash) 
Time Constraint _____ (The ship needs to get to PD in a hurry) 
Personal Experience _____ (You have seen this stuff a million times) 
How confident were you in your ability to compute a solution given the AOU data? 
 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Not Confident           Mildly     Confident     Very  Extremely 
             Confident           Confident Confident 
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In this scenario you are required to proceed to PD.  Consider this trip to be a 
routine visit to receive the broadcast, ventilate, and train.  The submarine’s only threat is 
collision and the CO tells you to get us there as soon as you feel comfortable.  Stop the 
scenario once you are ready to proceed to PD. 
What was your final solution for the COI?  
Range       + or -      , Bearing       + or -      , Course       + or -       
 
Using a range between 1 and 10 (10 being the most), answer how much each factor weighed in 
your decision making. 
Safety of ship _____ (Do not want to sink the ship) 
Job Satisfaction _____ (You have trained hard so show it) 
Job Security/ Promotion _____ (Do not want to be relieved or demoted for collision) 
Letting down the team _____ (Everyone is counting on you to make a good decision) 
Mission Accomplishment _____ (Be the best boat on the waterfront) 
Personal Satisfaction _____ (You do everything well, even taking out the trash) 
Time Constraint _____ (The ship can take more time) 
Personal Experience _____ (You have seen this stuff a million times) 
 
How confident were you in your ability to compute a solution given the AOU data? 
 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Not Confident           Mildly       Confident   Very  Extremely 





























In this scenario you are required to destroy an enemy submarine.  The 
submarine you are hunting is inferior to your own, you have multiple torpedoes, and your 
sensors are much better than their sensors.  The CO wants to ensure that we sink the 
submarine on the first shot.  Stop the scenario once you are comfortable with the COI 
solution to fire a torpedo. 
What was your final solution for the COI?  
Range       + or -      , Bearing       + or -      , Course       + or -       
 
Using a range between 1 and 10 (10 being the most), answer how much each factor weighed in 
your decision making. 
Safety of ship _____ (Do not want to be shot at) 
Job Satisfaction _____ (You have trained hard so show it) 
Job Security/ Promotion _____ (Do not want to be relieved or demoted for collision) 
Letting down the team _____ (Everyone is counting on you to make a good decision) 
Mission Accomplishment _____ (Be the best boat on the waterfront) 
Personal Satisfaction _____ (You do everything well, even taking out the trash) 
Time Constraint _____ (The ship can take more time) 
Personal Experience _____ (You have seen this stuff a million times) 
How confident were you in your ability to compute a solution given the AOU data? 
 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Not Confident           Mildly       Confident    Very  Extremely 




























In this scenario you are required to destroy an enemy submarine.  The 
submarine you are hunting is equivalent to your own.  There is only one torpedo left and 
your sensors are similar to their sensors.  The CO wants to ensure that we sink the 
submarine on the first shot and also to not get shot at ourselves.  Stop the scenario once 
you are comfortable with the COI solution to fire a torpedo. 
What was your final solution for the COI?  
Range       + or -      , Bearing       + or -      , Course       + or -       
 
Using a range between 1 and 10 (10 being the most), answer how much each factor weighed in 
your decision making. 
Safety of ship _____ (Do not want to sink the ship) 
Job Satisfaction _____ (You have trained hard so show it) 
Job Security/ Promotion _____ (Do not want to be relieved or demoted for collision) 
Letting down the team _____ (Everyone is counting on you to make a good decision) 
Mission Accomplishment _____ (Be the best boat on the waterfront) 
Personal Satisfaction _____ (You do everything well, even taking out the trash) 
Time Constraint _____ (The ship needs to make a decision quick) 
Personal Experience _____ (You have seen this stuff a million times) 
How confident were you in your ability to compute a solution given the AOU data? 
 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Not Confident           Mildly      Confident  Very  Extremely 
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APPENDIX C: NASA TASK LOAD INDEX 
We are interested not only in assessing your performance but also the experiences you had during 
the task.  In the most general sense we are examining the “workload” you experienced.  The factors that 
influence your experience of workload may come from the task itself, your feelings about your performance, 
how much effort you put in, or the stress and frustration you felt. 
Since workload is something experienced by each person, there are no effective “rulers”  that can 
be used to estimate the workload of different activities.  One way to find out about workload is to ask people 
to describe the feelings they experienced.  Because workload may be caused by many different factors, we 
would like you to evaluate several of them individually rather than lumping them into a single global 
evaluation of workload.  Please read the definitions of the six scales carefully. 
 
• Mental Demand:  whether this task affects a user’s attention, brain, and focus. 
• Physical Demand: whether this task affects a user’s health, makes a user tired, etc. 
• Temporal Demand: whether this task takes a lot of time that a user can’t afford. 
• Effort:   whether a user has spent a lot of effort for this task. 
• Performance:  whether this task is heavy or light in terms of workload. 
• Frustration:  whether this task makes a user unhappy or frustrated. 
 
 Now you will perform a rating task.  In the rating task, you will evalutate the task by marking each of 
the 6 rating scales at the point which matches your experience.  Each scale has two end point descriptors 
that describe the scale.  Please consider your responses carefully in distinguishing amoung the task 
conditions.  Consider each scale individually. 
 
MENTAL DEMAND 
 Low         High 
 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
 Low         High 
 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
 Low         High 
 
EFFORT 
 Low         High 
 
PERFORMANCE 




Low         High 
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APPENDIX D: POST SCENARIO QUESTIONNAIRE 
Post Scenario Questionnaire.  Subject #_____ 
Please consider your answers carefully and mark your responses on the 
scales provided.  Any comments you have will be useful in developing 
tools and displays to be used on future submarine platforms.  Thank 
you for your time and effort, your participation is very much 
appreciated. 
 
1. Having a graphical representation of the COI range estimation made 
it easier to compute a solution range. 
 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Strongly  Disagree     Neither Agree  Agree  Strongly 
   Disagree        nor Disagree    Agree 
 










Not           Somewhat    Moderately  Very  Extremely  
Useful    Useful         Useful        Useful Useful 
 






3. Did you find that there was a difference in using the AOU with 











4. Compared with past TMA experiences, the displayed AOU reduced the 
time required to compute the solution. 
 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Strongly  Disagree Neither Agree  Agree  Strongly 
   Disagree    nor Disagree    Agree 
 






5. What factors, in your mind, contribute to making these tasks 
difficult?   (Please list all factors and how each one made the 








6. During the targeting scenario, with regard to your contact 
solution, I considered the torpedoes abilities to detect a threat even 
though the solution may have been inaccurate. 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Strongly  Disagree Neither Agree  Agree  Strongly 
   Disagree    nor Disagree    Agree 
 






7. During the navigation scenarios what was your limiting factors that 









8. It was easy to understand the meaning of the information presented 
in the displayed AOU. 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Strongly  Disagree Neither Agree       Agree  Strongly 
   Disagree    nor Disagree    Agree 
 






9. I am highly confident in my abilities to conduct TMA in both 
targeting and navigation scenarios in the fleet. 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Strongly  Disagree Neither Agree  Agree  Strongly 
   Disagree    nor Disagree    Agree 
 






10. How much did your prior training experience help you in 
decision making today? 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
Very Little        Somewhat    Moderately    A lot Great Extent 
 






11. My experience with US torpedoes affected my decision making 
ability regarding contact solutions before firing. 
|_______________|______________|______________|______________| 
   Strongly  Disagree Neither Agree  Agree  Strongly 
   Disagree    nor Disagree    Agree 
 



































APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
Experimental Protocol: Script in green was spoken aloud to each participant. 
Prior to subject entering: 
Arrange consent forms, questionnaire ready, 
computer on, camera ready, program ready. 
 
“This is an unclassified experiment based on the 
problem of predicting uncertainty.  We will be using 
four scenarios chosen in a random order. Two of the 
scenarios will be tactical and two will be navigational 
in nature and they will all be different with the 
exception of the mission requirements.  I will explain 
the direction for each scenario before we start each 
one. The instructions that apply to one scenario may 
not apply to another.” 
 
“After each scenario you will complete one page of 
the questionnaire as well as a workload questionnaire.  
After the last scenario you will be asked to complete 
the Post-scenario and bio questions.” 
 
“The ellipses give you two areas of uncertainty. These 
are 66%, and 95% containment. They will be color 
coded differently for each scenario, but the percent 
containment will remain the same. 
- The solution screen will update itself 
approximately every 10sec. 
- Range Rings are established every 5000 
yards. 
- Ownship data will be displayed on the right 
hand side of the screen for your convenience. 
- COI data is also available on the right hand 
side of the screen.  You can consider this 
information to be the on watch FTOW’s 
solution using the Fire Control computer.  It is 
not truth but is available for your use. 
- Once you ‘click’ the stop button at the bottom 
of the screen the picture will disappear.  At 
this point you will be required to fill out the 
appropriate forms. 
- There will be a video recorder observing your 
actions 
- Do you have any questions for me?  If you 
have any questions during the scenario, 
please ask. “ 
 
Nav: This is a navigation scenario. The goal is to 
understand the situation well enough to come to PD. 
Hit “Stop” when you are ready to come to PD.  Your 
submarine does not need to be on the best course to 
proceed to PD. 
 
Targeting: This is an approach and attack scenario. 
The goal is to localize the COI well enough to shoot. 
Hit “stop” when you know the solution. You do not 
need to be in a firing position. 
“Your main focus will be range and bearing to the 
COI.  The COI course is also requested but it is 
understood to be extremely difficult for an accurate 
course using the AOU.  The order of importance in the 
scenarios will be range then bearing and a course if 
you feel comfortable with one.  Let us begin” 
Administer each scenario and record the results. 
Remember to thank them for their time and to ask if 
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APPENDIX F: CONSENT FORM 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Act as a Research Participant 
How to Display Uncertainty in a Complex and Crowded Submarine Environment 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. Before you give your consent to 
volunteer, it is important that you read the following information and ask as many 
questions as necessary to be sure you understand what you will be asked to do.  
Investigator: James Prouty 
Purpose of the Study: This study is designed to evaluate three different levels of expertise in 
submarine subject matter experts.  Specifically these experts will be evaluated on their 
generated contact solutions based on their use of displays associated with target motion 
analysis. 
 
Description of the Study:  This study will explore and empirically evaluate new ways to 
graphically represent the Area of Uncertainty (AOU) for a submerged contact.  I will administer 
scenarios to senior officers, junior officers, and fire control technicians who are submarine 
subject matter experts.  By using the contact solutions generated by the participants, and a 
survey designed to collect their thought processes, I will investigate the different logistical 
strategies employed by the three groups.  
Risks or Discomforts: Respondents range solutions will be published in a masters thesis 
distributed by the Naval Postgraduate School and analysis of the responses will be used to 
draw conclusions in the aforementioned thesis research paper. Anonymity is guaranteed to the 
participants in the experiment, and at no time will your name be published along with your 
answers. Only the thesis researchers will see the survey responses with respondent names 
included. 
Benefits of the Study: Your participation in this study will aid in research regarding the 
effectiveness and possible changing of displays in the submarine environment.  
Possible benefits of your participation in this study are an improved range display that 
may be generated as a result of this research.   
Confidentiality: Names are only linked to data by anonymous codes. Only group, or otherwise 
anonymous, data will be reported.  Confidentiality will be maintained to the extent allowed by 
law.  
Incentives to Participate: Participation in this study is voluntary and you will not be paid to 
participate in this study.  
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Voluntary Nature of Participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. Your choice of 
whether or not to participate will not influence your future relations with the Naval 
Postgraduate School. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent 
and to stop your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you 
are allowed.  
Questions about the Study: If you have any questions about the research now, please ask. 









If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may 
contact the NPS-IRB Administrative Official: 
Ms. Danielle Kuska 
(831) 656-2099 
dkuska@nps.edu  
Consent to Participate: The Naval Postgraduate School - Institutional Review Board has 
approved this consent form, as signified by the Board's stamp. The consent form must 
be reviewed annually and expires on the date indicated on the stamp.  
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information in this document and 
have had a chance to ask any questions you have about the study. Your signature also 
indicates that you agree to be in the study and have been told that you can change your 
mind and withdraw your consent to participate at any time. You have been given a copy 
of this consent form. You have been told that by signing this consent form you are not 
giving up any of your legal rights.  
I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT I AM MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO 
PARTICIPATE. MY SIGNATURE INDICATES THAT I HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE, 
HAVING READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE. 
 
____________________________________  
Name of Participant (please print)  
   
 
 _____________________________________ __________________  
Signature of Participant    Date  
   
 
_____________________________________ __________________  
Signature of Investigator    Date  
Subject #       Date       
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APPENDIX G. RECORDED NASA TASK LOAD INDEX AND 
PERSONAL TRAITS FOR SCENARIO ONE 
Overall 




























3 2.8 0.4 0.6 1.6 1.3 2.6 10 5 5 10 10 7 8 9 1.5 
4 3 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.4 1 10 10 7 10 10 9 4 8 1 
7 1.9 0.1 2 3.1 1 2 10 10 5 10 10 8 8 1 1 
8 2.7 0.6 1.6 2.2 1.5 1.3 10 5 4 10 10 5 7 8 2 
9 3.2 0.1 2 3.2 1.6 1.2 10 10 10 10 8 8 6 8 1 
10 2.7 1.7 2 2.3 1.5 2.1 9 7 5 6 10 4 8 4 3 
11 3.4 2 2 1 2.6 1.4 1 10 1 10 7 7 8 7 2.5 
12 3.8 2 0.4 3.6 2.6 1.8 10 7 7 9 10 6 10 5 1.8 
14 3 1 2 1 1 1.6 10 8 6 10 10 9 9 9 2.4 
15 2.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.3 10 7 9 8 10 7 8 6 1.4 
Expert One 




























1 1.9 0.35 0.95 1.1 1.16 1.85 9 7 7 8 6 7 8 5 1 
2 2.8 0.3 2 2.1 1.7 2.4 8 6 8 7 6 9 8 3 1 
5 3.4 1.2 3.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 10 7 4 5 8 7 8 5 2 
6 3.4 0.5 3.4 2.9 2.9 3.6 8 1 1 6 8 6 8 1 1 
13 3.7 2.3 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.7 9 5 4 6 10 4 10 5 2 
18 3 0.4 2 2.6 2 2.4 10 7 4 7 5 7 5 4 1.5 
19 3.6 0.8 3.8 3.8 3 4 5 5 2 8 8 8 10 8 0 
21 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 0.6 1 5 4 3 6 7 2 8 2 
25 1 0.3 2.7 2.4 2 0.2 10 1 1 2 9 8 10 5 0.8 
30 2.7 1.1 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.2 10 7 7 8 10 9 8 7 2.5 
Expert Two 




























16 2 1 3 1 2 2 10 6 6 10 10 8 2 8 2.5 
17 3.1 1.6 2.7 2.3 2.2 1.6 10 7 10 10 10 7 5 7 2.8 
20 2.4 0.1 1 1 0.6 2.6 10 7 2 6 8 7 4 8 2.5 
22 2.5 1.1 1 2.2 1.5 0.9 10 9 7 7 8 8 4 6 2.5 
23 3 0.3 1.4 1.6 1.1 0.3 10 1 1 2 10 2 9 7 3 
24 2.2 1.7 0.5 2.2 3.1 1.8 10 8 4 8 8 8 8 2 2 
26 1.6 0.4 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.6 9 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 2 
27 2.5 0.1 2.2 0.8 2.4 0.8 10 5 10 7 8 8 9 9 2.6 
28 1.4 0.2 1.6 1 1.3 1.1 10 3 3 5 7 4 6 6 2 
29 1.4 0 0.9 1.8 2 1 10 1 1 1 8 6 7 8 3 
Expert Three 
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APPENDIX H. RECORDED NASA TASK LOAD INDEX AND 
PERSONAL TRAITS FOR SCENARIO TWO 
Overall 




























3 3.2 0.3 0.8 1.6 1.4 2.6 10 6 4 10 10 5 7 6 2 
4 2.6 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.4 10 10 6 10 10 9 4 8 2 
7 1.6 0 1.2 2.9 1.2 1.1 10 9 4 9 10 9 2 4 1.8 
8 3 0.4 0.4 2.4 1 1.6 10 5 5 10 10 3 2 8 3 
9 3.4 0.4 1.4 2.8 1.8 1.6 10 8 8 10 8 9 10 8 2 
10 3 2 3 2 1.2 2.4 10 7 4 9 6 4 8 3 3 
11 3 1 2.6 1.6 1 1.2 7 7 1 10 8 7 6 5 2.5 
12 3.6 2 0.4 3.6 2.4 1 10 8 8 10 10 7 8 6 2.1 
14 3.2 0.8 1.6 0.8 0.8 1.8 10 9 6 10 10 9 10 9 2 
15 2.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 1 1.4 10 8 9 8 10 7 1 6 1.5 
Expert One 




























1 1.5 0.5 0.7 0.85 1 1.3 9 8 7 8 6 7 8 6 2.2 
2 2.6 0.5 1.6 1.8 1.6 2 7 6 8 5 5 8 4 3 1 
5 3.5 1 2.1 2 2 2 10 7 4 4 7 8 6 5 3 
6 3.2 0.6 3.4 2.4 2.6 2.2 10 1 1 6 6 6 1 1 1 
13 2.5 2 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.4 4 5 2 5 10 4 7 6 1.7 
18 2 0.5 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.6 8 7 5 7 5 7 3 4 1 
19 1.4 0.6 0.8 1 1 3 10 4 5 7 7 7 3 5 2 
21 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.9 2 10 5 6 7 7 7 10 7 2.8 
25 2 0.1 2.7 2 1.4 1 10 4 5 5 8 7 8 10 3.1 
30 2.1 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.1 0.6 8 7 7 8 10 8 7 8 2.8 
Expert Two 




























16 2 1 3 1 2 2 10 6 6 10 10 8 2 8 2.7 
17 2.9 1.6 2.4 2.2 2.4 1.2 10 7 10 10 10 7 2 7 3 
20 1.5 0.1 0.6 1.2 1.1 3 9 7 1 4 7 8 3 8 2.8 
22 2.4 1.1 1.4 2 1.2 1 10 8 6 8 8 8 5 7 3 
23 2.6 0.2 0.6 1.4 0.9 0.1 10 1 1 3 8 2 7 6 3 
24 2 1.4 0.4 2 3 2 10 8 4 8 8 8 8 4 2 
26 1.2 0.7 2 1.4 2 3 10 1 1 1 1 1 8 8 3 
27 2.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.8 0.5 10 5 10 7 8 8 9 9 2.8 
28 1 0.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 10 3 3 5 7 5 5 5 2 
29 1.4 0 0.9 1.8 2 1 10 1 1 1 8 7 7 7 2 
Expert Three 
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APPENDIX I. RECORDED NASA TASK LOAD INDEX AND 
PERSONAL TRAITS FOR SCENARIO THREE 
Overall 




























3 2.6 0.3 0.5 0.8 1 0.8 10 7 4 10 10 7 9 5 2 
4 2.6 0.3 0.5 1 0.5 1.6 5 10 7 10 10 9 3 8 0.5 
7 2.9 0.1 1.6 3.2 1.4 1.4 10 9 3 10 10 9 4 5 1.8 
8 3 0.4 0.4 2 2 2 10 5 2 10 10 5 2 5 1 
9 3.5 0.6 1.5 2.9 2.2 1.2 10 8 8 10 10 10 6 5 1 
10 3.2 1.5 1.6 2 1.8 2.8 8 7 3 6 9 5 10 2 2 
11 4 3 0.4 2.6 3 1.6 1 7 1 10 10 7 1 8 3.5 
12 3.6 3 1 3.2 3 1 10 8 8 10 10 9 5 6 2.2 
14 2.9 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.8 1.8 10 9 7 10 10 9 9 9 2.7 
15 1.4 0.3 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.8 10 7 4 9 10 7 6 6 1.2 
Expert One 




























1 3 0.8 1.15 1.3 1.2 2.3 9 8 7 8 7 8 9 6 2.6 
2 2.1 0.2 1.2 2 1.6 1.8 6 7 5 8 7 9 6 3 2 
5 3.4 2.9 2 2.9 2.9 2.4 10 8 3 4 7 7 8 1 2 
6 3.2 0.7 2 2.3 2.4 2.1 8 1 1 7 8 5 5 1 1.2 
13 3 2 1.8 3 2.5 2.1 1 1 1 3 6 6 10 2 1 
18 2.8 0.5 1.6 2.6 2.4 2 5 7 4 7 8 7 4 3 2 
19 3.6 0.8 3.8 3.8 3 4 5 5 2 8 8 8 10 8 0 
21 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 10 6 4 7 5 6 10 6 1.5 
25 1.8 0.2 2.6 2.4 1.4 0.2 10 3 2 8 9 8 4 5 1.3 
30 2.9 1.6 1.8 2.9 2.2 1.9 10 8 8 9 10 8 6 6 1.8 
Expert Two 




























16 2 1 3 1 2 2 10 6 6 10 10 8 2 8 3 
17 3.6 1.6 3 2.6 2.3 1.4 10 7 10 10 7 7 3 7 3.8 
20 1.5 0.1 1.2 1.3 1 2.8 8 7 1 4 7 7 6 8 2.5 
22 2.7 1.5 2 3.2 2.8 3.5 9 9 5 7 9 9 7 6 1.3 
23 3.2 0.4 1.2 1.8 1.2 0.4 10 1 1 2 10 2 4 4 3.2 
24 2.1 1.8 0.7 2.3 3.2 1.6 10 8 4 8 8 8 6 4 1.8 
26 1.6 0.4 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.6 9 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 2 
27 3 0.1 1 1 2.6 1.1 10 5 3 9 9 7 7 10 3.3 
28 2 0.7 2 1.6 1.6 1.6 5 4 3 6 9 4 8 5 2 
29 1 0 0.9 1.5 2 1 10 1 1 1 7 7 7 8 2 
Expert Three 
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APPENDIX J. RECORDED NASA TASK LOAD INDEX AND 
PERSONAL TRAITS FOR SCENARIO FOUR 
Overall 




























3 3 0.2 0.2 0.9 1.1 2 3 6 5 9 9 9 9 9 0 
4 2.8 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.6 10 10 6 10 10 9 10 10 2 
7 2.9 0.1 3.4 3 1.9 2.2 10 9 2 10 10 9 8 5 1.6 
8 2.4 0.2 2.2 2.7 2 1 10 5 3 10 10 3 10 8 2 
9 3.6 0.2 3 3 2 2.4 10 10 8 10 10 10 4 7 3 
10 3.4 2.4 3.5 3 2.1 3.4 9 6 4 8 7 5 10 3 2 
11 4 3 0.8 3 3 1.6 1 10 1 10 10 10 7 7 3 
12 3.7 3 1 3.2 3.2 1.3 10 8 6 9 10 8 9 5 2 
14 3.1 0.6 1.5 0.7 0.9 2 10 9 7 10 10 9 10 9 2.7 
15 2.6 0.2 0.8 0.8 1.2 2 10 8 4 9 10 7 10 6 2.3 
Expert One 




























1 2.7 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.5 10 8 8 9 9 8 7 6 2.9 
2 2.4 0.4 1.4 2 1.6 2.2 8 7 3 8 8 10 7 3 1 
5 3.6 2 3 3 3 2.5 10 6 4 5 7 8 4 1 2 
6 3.2 0.7 1.8 2.3 2.5 1.6 9 1 1 6 9 5 9 1 1 
13 3.4 1.6 2.5 3.2 3 3 3 3 1 6 10 7 10 5 1 
18 3 0.6 2.6 3 2.6 2.8 8 7 4 7 7 7 7 4 2 
19 1.9 0.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 3.6 5 6 2 9 10 8 8 8 1 
21 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 2 1.8 10 7 4 6 8 7 10 6 2 
25 1 1.4 4 2.8 2.6 1.6 10 5 4 7 8 8 7 5 2.5 
30 3 1.6 1.8 2.9 2.3 1.9 8 8 5 8 10 7 8 4 1.7 
Expert Two 




























16 2 1 3 1 2 2 10 6 6 10 10 8 2 8 3 
17 3.8 1.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 1.8 10 7 10 10 10 7 7 7 3 
20 1.6 0.1 1.4 1.4 1.2 3.4 8 6 1 6 8 7 7 8 2.5 
22 3 1.2 1.8 3 2.8 2.4 10 8 4 8 9 9 6 3 2 
23 3.4 0.4 0.8 2 1.2 0.2 3 5 1 3 10 6 8 6 2 
24 2.2 1.8 0.7 2.4 3.3 2.1 10 8 4 8 8 8 7 5 1.9 
26 2 0.2 2.6 2.4 2.3 3 10 2 2 3 8 3 8 1 1 
27 3.5 0.2 1.6 1.6 3.2 1.5 10 5 3 9 9 7 7 10 2.7 
28 2 0.8 2 0.7 1.6 1.6 10 4 3 7 8 4 5 4 2 
29 1 0 0.6 1 1.5 1 10 1 1 1 7 7 8 8 3 
Expert Three 
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APPENDIX K. SCENARIO ONE RAW DATA 
Expert Time  Range  Range +/- 
Range 
Difference Within Range  Over or Under 
1 14.500 3.0 1.5 3.041 0 0 
1 11.500 4.0 1.0 2.892 0 0 
1 5.167 3.3 0.8 0.521 1 1 
1 7.167 3.5 1.0 0.771 1 0 
1 7.000 3.5 0.5 0.641 0 0 
1 11.167 2.0 1.5 5.381* 0 0 
1 12.667 3.5 1.0 3.083 0 0 
1 6.167 6.0 1.0 2.623 0 1 
1 6.000 4.0 0.5 0.746 0 1 
1 14.833 4.7 1.5 1.262 1 0 
2 7.000 4.0 1.0 0.011 1 0 
2 9.667 2.0 0.5 4.284 0 0 
2 8.000 4.0 1.0 0.932 1 0 
2 14.833 5.0 0.5 0.962 0 0 
2 14.833 4.5 1.0 1.462 0 0 
2 15.000 5.0 2.0 0.962 1 0 
2 5.000 4.0 0.2 1.335 0 1 
2 6.167 3.0 1.0 0.377 1 0 
2 5.667 4.2 1.3 1.068 1 1 
2 4.500 3.2 1.0 0.777 1 1 
3 7.500 2.5 1.0 2.034 0 0 
3 6.300 2.5 1.5 1.002 1 0 
3 4.667 4.5 0.5 2.053 0 1 
3 7.667 3.5 1.2 1.166 1 0 
3 9.000 3.8 0.5 1.939 0 0 
3 8.000 6.0 1.5 1.068 1 1 
3 5.167 3.8 0.4 1.021 0 1 
3 5.000 2.5 0.2 0.165 1 0 
3 7.300 4.5 1.0 0.098 1 1 
3 10.000 4.0 1.0 2.557 0 0 
* Note: This value is greater than three standard 
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APPENDIX L. SCENARIO TWO RAW DATA 
Expert Time  Range  Range +/- Range Difference Within Range  Over or Under 
1 8.000 12.0 3.0 4.012 0 0 
1 2.667 10.0 3.0 4.967 0 0 
1 2.500 10.0 2.0 4.804 0 0 
1 7.000 11.0 3.0 4.560 0 0 
1 6.167 12.0 2.0 3.237 0 0 
1 5.667 7.0 2.0 8.275 0 0 
1 8.500 12.0 2.0 4.259 0 0 
1 5.667 10.0 1.0 5.275 0 0 
1 1.833 7.5 1.0 6.555 0 0 
1 7.833 14.0 2.0 1.918 1 0 
2 4.000 7.5 2.0 8.017 0 0 
2 10.300 15.0 3.0 2.650 1 0 
2 6.667 15.0 5.0 0.390 1 0 
2 3.500 8.0 0.5 7.472 0 0 
2 4.667 12.0 2.0 3.413 0 0 
2 11.833 16.0 2.0 3.382 0 0 
2 2.833 10.0 1.0 5.061 0 0 
2 8.000 12.0 2.0 4.012 0 0 
2 5.833 15.5 4.0 0.225 1 1 
2 2.833 10.0 2.0 5.061 0 0 
3 2.667 12.0 4.0 2.967 1 0 
3 6.500 14.0 1.0 1.267 0 0 
3 6.167 11.0 3.0 4.237 0 0 
3 4.000 9.0 2.6 6.517 0 0 
3 9.000 13.0 3.0 3.573 0 0 
3 4.300 8.5 0.3 6.977 0 0 
3 2.500 9.0 2.0 5.804 0 0 
3 2.667 12.0 2.0 2.967 0 0 
3 5.667 10.0 2.0 5.275 0 0 
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APPENDIX M. SCENARIO THREE RAW DATA 
Expert Time  Range  Range +/- Range Difference Within Range  
Over or 
Under 
1 5.167 4.0 0.5 1.221 0 1 
1 10.000 3.4 2.0 3.157 0 0 
1 9.500 4.0 1.5 2.147 0 0 
1 15.000 4.5 1.0 1.424 0 0 
1 5.833 3.5 0.5 0.368 1 1 
1 7.300 3.0 0.5 1.402 0 0 
1 12.667 4.0 1.0 2.583 0 0 
1 14.667 5.0 1.0 1.041 0 0 
1 7.667 3.0 0.5 1.666 0 0 
1 7.500 3.0 0.5 1.534 0 0 
2 6.300 2.5 1.0 1.002 0 0 
2 6.000 3.0 1.0 0.254 1 0 
2 13.000 4.5 1.0 1.985 0 0 
2 10.833 4.0 0.5 3.106 0 0 
2 15.000 5.5 1.0 0.424 1 0 
2 15.000 2.0 3.0* 3.962 0 0 
2 6.667 3.0 1.0 0.882 1 0 
2 5.833 3.5 0.5 0.368 1 1 
2 5.167 4.0 0.5 1.221 0 1 
2 6.300 4.0 1.0 0.498 1 1 
3 7.667 3.6 1.6 1.066 1 0 
3 9.000 3.5 0.5 2.239 0 0 
3 9.500 4.0 1.0 2.147 0 0 
3 11.167 4.0 1.0 3.381 0 0 
3 5.167 4.5 0.5 1.721 0 1 
3 6.833 3.0 1.5 1.011 1 0 
3 4.833 4.0 1.0 1.445 0 1 
3 15.000 6.0 2.0 0.038 1 1 
3 6.300 2.3 0.3 1.202 0 0 
3 6.667 2.1 0.3 1.782 0 0 
* Note: This value is greater than three standard 
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APPENDIX N. SCENARIO FOUR RAW DATA 
Expert Time  Range  Range +/- Range Difference Within Range  
Over or 
Under 
1 5.167 4.0 0.5 1.221 0 1 
1 10.000 3.4 2.0 3.157 0 0 
1 9.500 4.0 1.5 2.147 0 0 
1 15.000 4.5 1.0 1.424 0 0 
1 5.833 3.5 0.5 0.368 1 1 
1 7.300 3.0 0.5 1.402 0 0 
1 12.667 4.0 1.0 2.583 0 0 
1 14.667 5.0 1.0 1.041 0 0 
1 7.667 3.0 0.5 1.666 0 0 
1 7.500 3.0 0.5 1.534 0 0 
2 6.300 2.5 1.0 1.002 0 0 
2 6.000 3.0 1.0 0.254 1 0 
2 13.000 4.5 1.0 1.985 0 0 
2 10.833 4.0 0.5 3.106 0 0 
2 15.000 5.5 1.0 0.424 1 0 
2 15.000 2.0 3.0 3.962 0 0 
2 6.667 3.0 1.0 0.882 1 0 
2 5.833 3.5 0.5 0.368 1 1 
2 5.167 4.0 0.5 1.221 0 1 
2 6.300 4.0 1.0 0.498 1 1 
3 7.667 3.6 1.6 1.066 1 0 
3 9.000 3.5 0.5 2.239 0 0 
3 9.500 4.0 1.0 2.147 0 0 
3 11.167 4.0 1.0 3.381 0 0 
3 5.167 4.5 0.5 1.721 0 1 
3 6.833 3.0 1.5 1.011 1 0 
3 4.833 4.0 1.0 1.445 0 1 
3 15.000 6.0 2.0 0.038 1 1 
3 6.300 2.3 0.3 1.202 0 0 
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